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Public Disclosure of "America's Secret Shame:",
Child Sex Offender Community
Notification in Illinois
Our country will not truly be safe again until all Americans take
personal responsibility for themselves, their families, and their
communities.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Every parent's nightmare became a horrifying reality for Mika
Moulton of Kankakee, Illinois, on August 7, 1995. On that day, she
reported her ten-year-old son, Christopher Meyer, missing.3 In the
next few. days, Christopher's bicycle and shoes, as well as a pair of
boys' underpants, were recovered.4 Finally, on August 15, 1995,
police found Christopher's body, evidencing over forty stab wounds,
in a shallow grave among trees and shrubbery in an Illinois state park.5
1. CONFERENCE ON THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD-SELECTED PAPERS AND COMMENTS 51
(Gad J. Bensinger & Thomas Frost eds., 1982) [hereinafter CONFERENCE] (Richard J.
Elrod, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, explained that because child sexual abuse is
extremely under-reported, it has been coined "America's secret shame.").
2. Carolyn Skorneck, Crime Law Cannot Do the Job Alone; President Asks
Americans to Help, REC. (Trenton, N.J.), Sept. 14, 1994, News, at 3 (quoting President
Clinton as he signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act into law).
President Clinton continued by saying that "'[e]ven this great law ... cannot do the job
alone .... By its own words, it is still a law. It must be implemented by you. And it
must be supplemented by you."' Id.
See infra part II.A.I for a discussion of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act.
3. Tim Tierney, Suspect Held in Kankakee; Murder Conviction Told; 10-year-old Still
Missing, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1995, § 2, Metro S.W., at 1. James Meyer, Christopher's
father, came from his home in Walla Walla, Washington, to aid the police in their
investigation. Id. Christopher's parents divorced seven years ago. Id. Meyer has
custody of his three children, including Christopher. Id. During the summer, the
children stay with Moulton in Kankakee. Id.
4. Id. Police recovered the bicycle and one of the shoes in an Illinois state park
where Christopher was last seen. Id. The other shoe was found four to five miles away.
Id. Volunteers found the underpants on a tree branch approximately twenty miles from
the park. Louise Kiernan & Jeffrey Bils, Kankakee Area Relives Shock After Kidnap
Arrest; As Search Continues for Boy, Buss' Past Comes into Focus, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13,
1995, § 2, Chicagoland, at 1.
5. Patrick Tuite, Ready or Not, Here They Come, CHI. LAW., Oct. 1995, at I1. "The
murder of Christopher Meyer, 10, is a tragedy of monumental proportions. No child
should be subjected to that type of death." Id.
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The man charged with his murder, Timothy Buss,6 had previously
been convicted and imprisoned for murdering 7 a five-year-old girl in
1981.8 In reaction to Christopher Meyer's tragic death and to the fact
that his alleged murderer lived in the community, residents of Illinois
began to demand greater protection for their children9 and them-
selves.'" In response to this community outrage, Illinois legislators
6. Tierney, supra note 3, at 1. Police focused on Timothy Buss after "preliminary
DNA test results showed that blood stains found in the trunk of a car driven by Buss
matched blood samples taken from the boy's parents and material taken from an oral
inhaler the boy used." Grand Jury to Hear Meyer Case, UPI, Aug. 24, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
7. Ed White, Illinois Police Believe They've Found Walla Walla Boy's Body, NEWS
TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 16, 1995, at A15. Buss served twelve years of a twenty-
five year sentence and was released early for good behavior. Convicted Murderer
Charged in Death of Boy, 10; Suspect Had Been Released From Prison for Good
Behavior, PEORIA J. STAR, Sept. 1, 1995, at A 12 [hereinafter Convicted Murderer].
Although Buss was never convicted of a sex crime, evidence showed that the girl had
been molested before being murdered. Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at I. The convic-
tion for the murder charge only, however, means that Buss would not have been eligible
for sex offender notification. Christi Parsons & John Kass, City, State Sex-offender
Alerts Proposed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1995, § 2, Metro Chicago, at 2. "Buss was a
convicted child killer but never had been convicted of sex crimes." Id. See infra note
18.
8. Convicted Murderer, supra note 7, at A12. On May 21, 1981, Tara Sue Huffman, of
Bradley, Illinois, disappeared. Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at 1. Buss, who also lived
in Bradley, actually joined the other volunteers in the search for the young girl. Id.
Consequently, police found Tara Sue's bludgeoned and sexually assaulted body in a
nearby trash can. Id.
9. Convicted Murderer, supra note 7, at A 12. "'Justice for Christopher Meyer
demands more than just bringing his killer to justice .... It demands we do more for
children in Illinois."' Id. (quoting Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan).
Because imprisonment expresses society's disapproval of the charged crime and
removes the offender from the victim's environment, some believe that "using the
criminal justice system is about the only really effective method we have of dealing with
this problem of child sexual abuse." CONFERENCE, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting Wayne A.
Meyer, Chief of Felony Review Section, Cook County, Ill., State's Attorney Office).
For example, in response to Christopher Meyer's murder, Jim Edgar, Governor of
Illinois, introduced three pieces of legislation imposing harsher penalties on violent
offenders: (1) requiring mandatory life sentences when, during an assault, a child is
murdered; (2) requiring mandatory life sentences for offenders as young as 13 years of
age who, during a sexual assault or aggravated kidnapping, murdered a child under 13;
and (3) trying minors 13 years of age or older as adults if charged with first-degree murder
in connectionwith a sexual assault or aggravated kidnapping. Emily Wilkerson, Edgar
Signs Truth-in-Sentencing Law; State Will Contract with Private Firms to Build More
Prisons, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, I11.), Aug. 21, 1995, at I.
10. Other Illinois residents suggest, as a form of protection against sex offenders,
increased utilization of Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act [hereinafter SDP Act].
See generally Matthew J. Herman, Note, Are the Children of Illinois Protected from Sex
Offenders?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 883 (1995) (discussing the SDP Act and the Illinois
Child Sex Offender Registration Act). The SDP Act, adopted in 1938, authorizes the
indefinite civil commitment of "persons suffering from a mental disorder, . . . coupled
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recently adopted a sex offender community notification law."
At the time of Meyer's death, a majority of states, including
Illinois, 2 had already enacted sex offender registration laws.'3 In gen-
eral, registration laws attempt to aid law enforcement officials in pro-
tecting the community by requiring convicted sex offenders who are
out of prison to register with local police in the community where they
reside. 14 Nationwide, however, a growing perception has emerged
that these registration laws provide insufficient protection for chil-
dren.'5 The continued commission of violent acts against children,
with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who have
demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of
children." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 205/1.01 (West Supp. 1995).
This Comment does not discuss truth-in-sentencing laws or the SDP Act. Rather, this
Comment focuses on the use of sex offender community notification laws as a means of
protection from sex offenders. For a discussion of the SDP Act, see Herman, supra, at
890-93; see also Joseph F. Grabowski V, Comment, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act: An Examination of a Statute in Need of Change, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437,
439-42 (1988); W. Scott Stewart, Comment, Concerning Proposed Legislation for the
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 3 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 407, 407-21 (1938); Edwin H.
Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543, 543-54
(1950).
1 1. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text. See also infra part III.A.-C.
12. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 150/1-10 (West 1995), as amended by Pub.
Act No. 89-8, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 286 (West). See infra part III.A for a discussion of
the Illinois Child Sex Offender Registration Act.
Illinois' sex offender registration law is currently being challenged in federal court.
Patricia Tennison & Joseph Sjostrom, Sex Offender Registration Hits Snags, CI. TRIB.,
Mar. 17, 1996, § 4, at 3. During the week of March 10, 1996, a convicted sex offender
filed suit in the United States district court in Rockford, Illinois, against the director of
the Illinois State Police, as well as the Rockford police chief. Id.
13. As of July, 1995, only ten states did not have sex offender registration laws:
Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 428 (N.J.
1995) (Stein, J., dissenting). By December, 1995, however, four of these states had
adopted sex offender registration, as well as sex offender notification, laws. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 692B (Supp. 1995); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 168-L(6) (McKinney Supp.
1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10 (Supp. 1995); 1995 Pa. Laws 24 (to be codified at
97 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799).
14. Sex offender registration laws aid law enforcement agencies with their
investigative duties. Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added
Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 730 (1994).
Designed to aid investigators ...these statutes generally require that, upon
release from prison (or at the outset of probation if no prison sentence is
dictated), a criminal convicted of one of an enumerated set of sex offenses must
register with local authorities and update this registration whenever he
changes addresses.
Id. See also Tracy L. Silva, Comment, Dial "I-900-PERVERT" and Other Statutory
Measures that Provide Public Notification of Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REV. 1961, 1975
(1995) (noting that registration laws help people locate child molesters).
15. For an example of the community's response to violent acts against children in
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often by ex-convicts who returned to the community after committing
similar acts of violence, has led to calls for stricter laws. 6 As a result,
a growing number of states are enacting sex offender community noti-
fication laws permitting, or mandating, law enforcement agencies to
give information to a community regarding sex offenders who move
there. I?
Even though a sex offender notification law may not have protected
Christopher Meyer, his death provided the necessary fuel to renew the
debate over the enactment of a similar notification law in Illinois. 8
Within three months of Christopher's death, several Illinois legislators
proposed bills providing for a sex offender notification law in
Illinois.' 9 The Illinois Child Sex Offender Community Notification
Act2° supplements the existing registration law by requiring local law
enforcement agencies to notify certain members of the community of
Illinois, see supra notes 9 and 10.
1 6. Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at I. Community notification laws "are largely the
result of reaction to several notorious cases in which children have been murdered by
convicts who returned to the community after committing similar crimes." Id. at 4.
17. Houston, supra note 14, at 730-31. See infra part II.A.2. While sex offender
community notification laws are often enacted quickly and with cause, such laws have
faced constitutional challenges. See infra part II.B.
18. Public Deserves Warnings About Convicted Sex Offenders, PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington, I11.), Aug. 20, 1995, at AI0 ("Expanding such public notice laws most
likely would not have saved the life of 10-year-old Christopher Meyer, whose body was
found in Kankakee River State Park. However, his violent death is likely to increase
support for such notice."). See also Parsons & Kass, supra note 7, at 1-2 (explaining
that "[aildermen and legislators have been feeling a sense of urgency on the issue [of sex
offender community notification] following the death this summer of 10-year-old
Christopher Meyer of Aroma Park, allegedly at the hand of a former inmate.").
19. During the 1995 Veto Session, two bills proposing the use of sex offender
community notification were introduced into the Illinois General Assembly. The House
Republicans introduced H.B. 2517, 89th II!. Gen. Assem., Veto Sess. (1995), sponsored
by Representatives Klingler and Spangler. 1995 IL. H.B. 2517, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, ILTRCK File. Likewise, the House Democrats introduced H.B. 2525, 89th
I1l. Gen. Assem., Veto Sess. (1995), sponsored by Representatives Curry and Novak.
1995 IL. H.B. 2517, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, ILTRCK File. For a discussion
of these bills, see infra part III.C.
Moreover, on November 1, 1995, Chicago Aldermen Thomas Allen and Patrick Levar
proposed an "ordinance that would require Chicago police to notify neighbors when a
convicted offender of any sex crime moves into the community." Parsons & Kass, supra
note 7, at I. Specifically, Chicago police would inform "neighborhood residents,
schools, and businesses that cater to minors" of the sex offender's address when he
moved into the area. Id. at 2. For a brief discussion of the city's proposal, see id. and
Christi Parsons, Notice Laws on Molesters Raise Flags, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1995, § 2,
Metro Chicago, at 1.
20. Corrections-Child Sex Offender Notification Law, Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 III.
Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 152/101-
130).
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the sex offender's presence there.2. While the new law appears to
offer further protection for children, concerns remain about the law's
constitutionality, as well as its pragmatic effects.'
This Comment examines some of the legal and social issues sur-
rounding sex offender notification laws, focusing on the new Illinois
notification law.23 This Comment first discusses the national trend in
enacting both sex offender registration 24 and sex offender community
notification laws, as well as the motivation for passing these laws.
Next, this Comment examines the different types of community notifi-
cation required in some jurisdictions. 26 This Comment then reviews
two potential constitutional challenges to the validity of community
notification laws: cruel and unusual punishment and right to privacy.
Next, this Comment discusses the development of registration laws
in Illinois and the shift towards promoting a sex offender notification
law.28 This Comment then analyzes the recently enacted Child Sex
Offender Community Notification Act in Illinois.29 As part of this
analysis, this Comment focuses particular attention on the consti-
tutional concerns the Act raises, as well as the harmful societal impact
of community notification laws.30 This Comment then proposes a
general plan aimed at preventing sexual abuse, emphasizing a proactive
approach rather than a reactive approach as illustrated by community
notification.3 Finally, this Comment concludes that community
2 I. ld. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
components of the new Act.
22. See infra part IV.
23. See infra part IV.
24. This Comment discusses sex offender registration laws only inasmuch as they
relate to sex offender notification laws. For a detailed review of sex offender registration
laws, see Houston, supra note 14, at 729-70.
25. See infra part II.A.
26. See infra part II.A.I-2.
27. See infra part ll.B. An examination of every constitutional issue relevant to
community notification laws is beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather, this
Comment primarily focuses on the major avenues of attack which appear to have
particular viability with regard to the Illinois sex offender notification provision.
Accordingly, these two challenges will be the central focus in this Comment's
background.
For a brief discussion of the variety of constitutional challenges to sex offender
notification laws, see infra note 80 and accompanying text. Because notification laws
are relatively new, there have been few constitutional challenges. More challenges are
likely to emerge, however, with the growing trend of enacting sex offender notification
laws.
28. See infra part Ill.
29. See infra part IV.
30. See infra part IV.
31. See infra part V.
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notification alone will not protect communities from sex offenders.32
Nonetheless, because of the national trend of enacting notification
laws, the Illinois General Assembly had no choice but to adopt some
form of a sex offender notification law in order to prevent an influx of
sex offenders into the state.33
II. BACKGROUND
Many state legislatures have enacted laws to protect potential victims
of sex offenders, including both registration and notification provi-
sions. This Part will discuss the national trend in enacting both types
of laws, examine the different types of community notification re-
quired in some jurisdictions, and review potential constitutional chal-
lenges to the validity of community notification laws.
A. National Trend in the Development of Notification Laws
Sex offenders represent a distinct threat to the community at large.34
Not only do the majority of research studies indicate that sex offenders
pose a relatively high rate of recidivism35 compared to other convicts, 36
but the number of sex crimes reported has also increased.37 Although
3 2. See infra part VI.
33. See infra parts V and V1.
34. Robert A. Prentky, The Assessment and Treatment of Sex Offenders, CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV., Mar. 1994, at 6. The increased number of sexual offenses reported each year
discloses a "problem of epidemic proportions." Id.
Most surveys of child sexual abuse have been unable to find a relationship between
abuse and social class. DAVID FINKELHOR & Assocs., A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE 67 (1986). "[Slexual abuse appears to be very democratic in its social class
distribution." Id. at 80. Because "the vast majority of [sex] offenders are male," this
Comment will use male pronouns when referring to sex offenders. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD MOLESTATION 25 (1984) [hereinafter NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM].
35. Generally, "recidivism" has been defined as the likelihood of reoffense after
capture and punishment. FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 130. Also, a "recidivist" is "[a]
habitual criminal; a criminal repeater. An incorrigible criminal. One who makes a trade
of crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990).
36. Recent Legislation: Criminal Law-Sex Offender Notification Statute-Wash-
ington State Community Protection Act Serves as a Model for Other Initiatives by
Lawmakers and Communities, 108 HARV. L. REV. 787, 791 (1995) [hereinafter Recent
Legislation]. The majority of experts believe that sex offenders cannot be cured.
Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at 4. But see Sutherland, supra note 10, -at 547 (noting
that sex offenders have a low rate of recidivism when compared with other types of
offenders). See also Silva, supra note 14, at 1965-66 (arguing that "it is difficult to
determine whether sex crime recidivism is higher than the recidivism rates for other
crimes").
37. Prentky, supra note 34, at 6. Authorities are unsure whether the increased number
of reported sex offenses actually represents an increase in sex offenses or simply an
increase in the reporting of crimes. Gordon C. N. Hall & Richard Hirschman, Sexual
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experts disagree as to whether or not sex offenders can be rehabili-
tated, 8 their studies do converge on the notion that sex offenders are,
at the very least, difficult to treat.39 These studies also lend credibility
to the frightful reality that sex offenders typically harm more than one
Aggression Against Children-A Conceptual Perspective of Etiology, CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV., Mar. 1992, at 8. Even today, sex offenses are notoriously underreported. See,
e.g., CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 132-33 (Emily Driver & Audrey Droisen eds., 1989) (noting
that only 3% of the estimated 22,000 cases of incest against children are reported in the
State of Illinois). See also Silva, supra note 14, at 1967 (explaining that although the
National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse confirmed nearly 200,000 cases of child
abuse in 1992, "many experts believe that the actual abuse rate is close to 1.4 million
per year, much greater than reported figures, because of the tendency for sexual crimes to
go unreported"). From the number of reported sex crimes, it is not difficult to recognize
the enormity of the dangers of sexual abuse by taking into consideration the unreported
crimes. CONFERENCE, supra note I, at 51. In addition, it has been noted that the
unreported incidents of rape also "contribut[e] to the problem of undetected recidivism."
Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 297 (1992).
38. Experts disagree for two reasons: first, recidivism rates vary among different
types of sex offenders, and second, researchers use different methods of measuring
recidivism. Joseph J. Romero & Linda M. Williams, Recidivism Among Convicted Sex
Offenders: A JO-year Follow-up Study, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1985, at 58 ("Much of the
confusion in the research can be attributed to differences in measuring recidivism of sex
offenders."). Compare, e.g., FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 134-36 (detailing a list of sex
offenders which are most likely to reoffend: offenders against minor boys, not
including incestual offenders; offenders with personality disorders; and offenders with a
history of prior offenses) with Lisa Anderson, Demand Grows to ID Molesters-States
Weigh Children's Safety versus Offenders' Rights, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1994, News, at I
(cataloguing repeat-offense rates for untreated sex offenders from the Handbook of
Sexual Assault by Canadian researchers William Marshall and Howard Barbaree: incest,
4-10%; rapists, 7-35%; molesters of girls, 10-29%; and molesters of boys, 13-40%).
Nonetheless, in Illinois alone, 3416 ex-convicts committed new crimes and returned
to prison last year. Tim Novak, Crime and Crime Again, State's Parole System Leaves
Ex-Cons Unsupervised, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at I. This recidivism has been
well documented:
A Sun-Times analysis of 3,400 parolees who were returned to prison within
the last year found that a majority had been arrested within eight months of
their earlier release dates. Four were arrested on the same day they got out, and
all but four percent were arrested within two years.
Id. at 14. Additionally, of the 19,187 inmates released from Illinois prisons last year, it
is estimated that approximately one-third of those former convicts will commit another
crimeand be sent back to prison within three years. Id. at 1.
39. Sexual Predators and Kids' Safety, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1994, Editorial, at 10.
See also Hall & Hirschman, supra note 37, at 9 (explaining that the effectiveness of
treatment programs directed at sexual offenders is limited); R. Karl Hanson et al., Long-
Term Recidivism of Child Molesters, 61 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 651 (1993)
(arguing that because of findings of long-term recidivism, researchers do not believe
that short-term treatment will be successful in controlling the risk posed by child
molesters). But see W.L. Marshall & W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment
Outcome with Sex Offenders, CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV., Mar. 1994, at 19-21 (finding that
treatment could positively effect the recidivism rate of sex offenders but only if the
treatment is comprehensive).
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victim. 40  Most significantly, children, more than any other class of
victims, suffer the greatest risk of harm at the hands of sex of-
fenders. 4' These statistics serve to emphasize the magnitude of the
problems surrounding sex crimes and society's need for legislative
protection.42
The likelihood of recidivism, as well as the lack of any definitive
evidence of the effectiveness of treatment programs,43 has led states to
enact laws to protect potential victims of these sex offenders.44 In
addition, the heightened public awareness of sex crimes, frequently
following well-publicized sex offenses, often acts as a catalyst for the
creation of both registration and notification laws.45  Recently,
40. Bochnewich, supra note 37, at 297. Research again diverges, however, with
respect to the average number of victims that fall prey to sex offenders. Compare id. at
296-97 (suggesting a mean rate of 11.7 victims per offender) with NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 34, at 25 (explaining that some sex offenders have admitted to molesting
hundreds of children).
41. Statistics show that as many as 2.5 million cases of child molestation occur
every year in the United States. NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 34, at 19. Although
child molestation is very difficult to measure because the term "molestation" has
numerous interpretations, it has been estimated that approximately one in every three
girls, and at least one in every three boys, are molested before their 18th birthday. Id. at
21.
Generally, the term "child molester" is "used to describe a person who has engaged in
sexual activity with a child." Judith V. Becker & John A. Hunter, Jr., Evaluations of
Treatment Outcome for Adult Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse, CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.,
Mar. 1992, at 75. It is important to note that the term "child molester" is not used
synonymously with the term "pedophile." FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 89. Rather,
pedophilia "is a state in which an individual is predisposed to use children for his or her
sexual gratification. [C]hild molesting [is] evidence of the existence of that state [of
pedophilia]." Id. at 90.
In a self-reporting survey, 207 convicted adult male sex offenders reported attempting
or completing sexual offenses against adult women 796 times (or 3.9 victims per
offender). Herman, supra note 10, at 909 n.186. The same group of 207 men reported
attempting or completing 14,950 sexual acts against children (or 72.2 victims per
offender). Id. Additionally, "[t]wenty-nine percent of all forcible rapes in America
occurred when the victim was less than I I-years-old." NATIONAL VICrIM CENTER, CRIME
AND VICTIMIZATION IN AMERICA, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 5 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter
NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER].
42. See supra notes 9 and 10 (noting the demand for such legislation).
43. FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 136. "[The lack of evidence], however, does not
mean that treatment is ineffective." Id. at 137. Rather, sex offender treatment programs
have not been properly evaluated in terms of their success in reducing long-term
recidivism. Id.
44. Joyce Price, States Find New Ways to Stop Sex Offenders, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1995, at Al ("High recidivism among predatory sex offenders has prompted some states
to enact laws to confine such offenders in high-security mental hospitals or track their
whereabouts after they are released from prison.").
45. Grabowski, supra note 10, at 438. Grabowski states that "[o]ften ... legislation
[ . is] enacted in response to growing public concern regarding sex crimes. This
interest ... [is] frequently generated following instances where well publicized rapes or
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legislatures and Congress have increasingly focused on notification
laws in response to the public outcry.46 The federal government and
many state governments have initiated a reactive response47 to the
problem by authorizing law enforcement personnel to inform com-
munity residents that convicted sex offenders are living among them.48
The scope and impact of these notification laws vary in each
jurisdiction. 49
1. The Federal Approach
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("Federal Crime Control
Act") into law. 50 The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Reg-
istration Act ("Crimes Against Children Act")5' is a provision of the
Federal Crime Control Act that requires states, as a condition to receiv-
ing undiminished federal crime fighting funds,52 to register certain
types of sex offenders with state law enforcement agencies. 53 Addi-
tionally, the Crimes Against Children Act permits the disclosure of
other notorious sex offenses" incite communities to act. Id. See also supra note 9
(detailing Governor Edgar's response to Christopher Meyer's death).
46. Recent Legislation, supra note 36, at 787. For example, the public's reaction to
the tragic sex crimes committed against a seven-year-old Washington boy by a repeat
sex offender inspired the passage of Washington's sex offender community notification
law. Raquel Blacher, Historical Perspective of the 'Sex Psychopath' Statute from the
Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 908-09
(1995). Likewise, New Jersey's community notification law resulted from the public
outrage following the sexual assault and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by her
neighbor, a twice convicted child sex offender. Midge Decter, Megan's Law and the New
York Times, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1994, at 61. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying
text (discussing New Jersey's sex offender community notification law). See infra parts
II.A.I and II.A.2 for a discussion of the national trend in implementing sex offender
community notification laws.
47. See infra part V for a discussion of the reactive nature of sex offender community
notification laws.
48. See infra parts II.A.l and II.A.2.
49. See Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at I (acknowledging that notification laws
range from "making lists of sex offenders available for public inspection to posting
signs on the offenders' homes"). For a detailed description of several state notification
laws, see infra part II.A.2.
50. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
170101, 108 Stat. 2038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Federal Crime Control Act]. See Herman, supra note 10, at 898.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 1995).
52. Id. § 14071(f)(2)(A). States have until September 13, 1997, to comply with the
Crimes Against Children Act before their crime fighting funds will be reduced. Id. §
14071(0(1).
53. Id. § 14071(a)(l)(A), (B). Those who must register include persons who are
"convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor," "convicted of a
sexually violent offense," or declared to be "sexually violent predators". Id.
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some of the registrants' personal information when necessary to pro-
tect the public from certain offenders.54 In essence, the Crimes
Against Children Act encourages states to establish registration, notifi-
cation, and tracking policies as a means of protecting individuals from
child molesters55 and other sex offenders.56 The federal requirements
regarding sex offender registration, as well as the authorization for
community notification, constitute a floor, rather than a ceiling, for
state sex offender registration and notification laws." States may
therefore impose additional or more demanding requirements on sex
offenders.5 8
2. State Approaches
Many states took the initiative and enacted sex offender community
notification laws even before the Federal Crime Control Act was
signed into law.59 To date, twenty-nine states have adopted some type
of sex offender notification laws requiring different degrees of disclo-
sure.60 Although the Federal Crime Control Act does not require that
54. Id. § 14071 (d)(3). The federal law also provides immunity from civil and criminal
liability for all state law enforcement agencies and personnel who act in good faith
pursuant to the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e).
55. Id. § 14071(d)(3). For a definition of "child molester," see supra note 41.
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(l)(A), (B) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(d)(3). The Proposed
Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act provide that the "general objective of the [Crimes Against
Children] Act is to protect people from child molesters and violent sex offenders
through registration requirements." 60 FED. REG. 18613 (1995) (proposed Apr. 12,
1995). See also Blacher, supra note 46, at 917 (illustrating that "[f]rom its onset, the
purpose of the proposed federal legislation was to encourage states to establish
registration and tracking procedures and community notification with respect to released
sexually violent predators").
57. 60 Fed. Reg. 18613. The proposed guidelines explain that "states that wish to
achieve compliance with the Jacob Wetterling Act should understand that its
requirements constitute a floor for state registration systems, not a ceiling ... ." Id.
58. Id. at 18616. For example, a state may have a registration system that covers a
broader class of sex offenders than those identified in the Crimes Against Children Act,
or requires address verification for such offenders at more frequent intervals than the Act
prescribes, or requires offenders to register for a longer period of time than the period
specified in the Act. Id. at 18613.
59. Eleven states enacted some form of sex offender community notification law by
1994: ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.086 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (1994);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290.4(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4120
(Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4909, 45-221(a)(29)(C) (Supp. 1994); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:546 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 612 (West
1994), tit. 34-A § 11003 (West Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.155 (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-1 i (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. §§
181.508(3), .509(I) (1994); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1995).
60. The following states provide for some type of community notification: ALASKA
STAT. § 18.65.086 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE §
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notification laws be retroactive, twenty-one of the twenty-nine state
notification statutes apply retroactively. 6' Most importantly, not all
290.4(a), (b) (Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1995);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120(Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.606 (West 1995); GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-9-44.1
(Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 9-340(1 l)(f) (Supp. 1995); IND. CODE. ANN. § 5-2-12-11
(West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4909 and 45-221(a)(29)(C) (Supp. 1994);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-546 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 612(West 1994), tit. 34-A § 11003 (West Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B
(Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 (Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-
507, -508 (1995), amended by 1995 Mont. Laws 407, 550; NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.155
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1995); N.Y.
CORRECTION LAW § 168-L(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10
(Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15.10 (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
57, § 584.E (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.508(3), .509(l) (1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-33, -34 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106(c)
(Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.550 (West 1995); Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be
codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 152/101-130); 1995 Pa. Laws 24 (to be
codified at 97 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799).
61. The following states apply their notification laws retroactively: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington. See supra note 60 for the full citation to the
notification laws of each of these states.
Generally, a "retroactive law" is a law "which take[s] away or impair[s] vested rights
acquired under existing laws, create[s] new obligations, impose[s] a new duty, or
attach[es] a new disability in respect to the transactions or considerations already past."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990).
The retroactive application of these laws raises several issues. For instance, the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the states from enacting a
law that renders an act punishable when it was lawful when committed or increases the
severity of the punishment attached to the crime from that applicable when it was
committed. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. When applied retroactively, sex offender
registration and community notification laws appear to increase the burden of
punishment for sex offenders convicted before the adoption of the laws. State v. Ward,
869 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 1994). The majority of courts, however, have held that
registration and notification laws are regulatory, rather than punitive; as such, they do
not impose any punishment on the sex offender, and do not violate Article 1, § 10 of the
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 1074 (holding that Washington's sex offender
registration and notification laws are regulatory and do not constitute punishment);
State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (concluding that Arizona's sex
offender registration statute "is regulatory in nature and not an unconstitutional ex post
facto law"); State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that Minnesota's sex offender registration statute is not punitive and therefore does not
violate federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws).
But see Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994) (indicating that,
although Alaska's sex offender registration law was constitutional, the state's
notification provision would likely violate an ex post facto challenge because it is
punitive in nature); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. 1995)
(finding New Jersey's sex offender registration provision regulatory and constitutional,
but its notification statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it applied
retroactively).
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states with community notification require law enforcement personnel
to notify individual community residents of the sex offender's pres-
ence. 62 At this time, New Jersey is the only state which mandates that
law enforcement personnel inform the public when sex offenders are
living among them. 63 By far, Washington,64 Louisiana, 65 Oregon,
66
62. See,' e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 615 (West 1994) (stating that a regis-
trant's personal information "may be disseminated to any person for any purpose")
(emphasis added); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106(c) (Supp. 1995) (providing that local
law enforcement agencies "may release relevant information deemed necessary to protect
the public concerning a specific sexual offender who is required to register") (emphasis
added); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting dissemination of sex
offender registry information except on inquiries, and only to authorized officers or
employees of schools, child welfare agencies, or day-care centers).
63. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 429 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting) (stating that
other states' notification provisions "either do not require law enforcement to notify the
public, or authorize far more limited public notification than that mandated by New
Jersey's statute"). See also Blacher, supra note 46, at 916-17 (giving a brief description
of New Jersey's sex offender community notification law). Notably, law enforcement
officials in New Jersey are mandated to disseminate a registrant's personal information
only if the sex offender poses a moderate or high risk of recidivism. Jenny A. Montana,
An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Abuse, 3 J. L. & POL'Y 569, 587
(1995).
New Jersey's sex offender registration and sex offender notification laws are
commonly referred to together as "Megan's Law." Poritz, 662 A.2d at 372. New Jersey
named these laws after Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl who was raped and murdered
by a repeat sex offender. Id. See also Decter, supra note 46, at 61 (providing the facts
surrounding Megan's disappearance).
64. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.550. In 1990, Washington enacted its
Community Protection Act and became the first state to permit community notification
of sex offenders. Recent Legislation, supra note 36, at 787. It has therefore served as a
model for other community notification laws. Id. Washington adopted this legislation
after a recently released sex offender lured a seven-year-old boy into a wooded area, raped
him, and then severed his penis. Blacher, supra note 46, at 908. Washington's law does
not provide specific notification guidelines; rather, local law enforcement agencies
establish the procedures by which information about sex offenders will be disclosed to
their community. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.550(2) (West 1995).
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.546.A (West Supp. 1995). Louisiana's sex offender
community notification law is unique in that it requires a convicted sex offender to per-
sonally send a notice by mail to those residents within one mile of his residence in a
rural area, or within a three block square radius in an urban or suburban area, as well as to
the superintendent of the school district in that community. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 895(H) (West 1995). Additionally, the sex offender must publish a notice of his
presence and past conviction in the local paper two separate times. Id. Moreover, the
state reserves the right to require the sex offender to publicize his presence in other
ways. Id.
66. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.508(3) (1994). Oregon has an innovative, and perhaps the
most public, sex offender community notification law. After the agency supervising the
sex offender determines that community notification is necessary, the agency is
permitted to use any means of communication that it deems appropriate. Id. In fact,
high risk sex offenders in Oregon must place a "stop sign-shaped" black and yellow
poster in the front window of their homes which reads "Sex Offender Residence."
Charlie Cain, Police Can Pinpoint Predators, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 28, 1995, at 6D. See
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and New Jersey67 have the most active and formal procedures for
community notification. 68
Nonetheless, New Jersey's sex offender notification law69 goes
further than any other law of its kind.7' These notification and regis-
tration laws represent an attempt to prevent future incidents of sexual
abuse and to protect New Jersey citizens from sex offenders.71 New
Jersey's sex offender registration and sex offender notification laws
are commonly referred to together as "Megan's Law., 72 "Megan's
Law" requires varying degrees of notification after sex offenders are
released from prison.73
Specifically, "Megan's Law" provides a three-tiered approach to the
dissemination of a registrant's personal information based on the sex
offender's risk of reoffense. 74 First, if the sex offender poses a low
also, Anderson, supra note 38, at I (describing the use of these signs in Oregon).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1995).
68. Anderson, supra note 38, at 1.
69. On March 15, 1996, a United States district court issued a preliminary injunction
banning community notification as it is set forth in "Megan's Law." Sex Offenders Win
Round vs. Megan's Law in N.J.: U.S. Judge Prohibits Alerting Communities, Mar. 16,
1996, § 1, at 2. The court determined that the law is unconstitutional in its retroactive
application. Id. See supra note 61 for a brief discussion of the constitutional concerns
that exist when sex offender registration and notification laws are applied retroactively.
This ruling, however, does not affect New Jersey's sex offender registration require-
ments. Sex Offenders Win Round, supra, at 2.
For a detailed analysis of New Jersey's notification law, see Lawrence S. Lustberg,
There They Go Again; The State Justices Affirm Their Independence on Constitutional
Issues, 140 N.J. L.J. 2268 (Supplement, Sept. 4, 1995); Montana, supra note 63, at
588-89; Bill Sanderson, Megan's Law Scaled Back; Notification to be Limited, RECORD
(Trenton, N.J.), Sept. 15, 1995, at Al; William Woo, Children and Rights Both at Risk
Over Sex Offenders, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Aug. 12, 1995, at 17A.
70. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 427-30 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting)
(explaining that New Jersey's notification policies are more extensive than any other
notification law in the United States). See also Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp.
666, 689 (D.N.J. 1995) (explaining that "a convicted sex offender's likeness, place of
employment, a description and identification of his motor vehicle, as well as" his name,
address, nature of crime and conviction are all disseminated to the public, and that
"Megan's Law goes well beyond all previous provisions for public access to an
individual's criminal history").
7 1. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 372.
72. Id. See also Decter, supra note 46, at 61 (providing the facts surrounding
Megan's disappearance). "Called 'Megan's Law' after the slain child, the statute seeks
to prevent recurrences by requiring varying degrees of public notice whenever sex
offenders are released into the community." Id.
73. Edward Martone, When a Sex Offender Moves In, Is There a Duty to Warn the
Community? No: Mere Illusion of Safety Creates Climate of Vigilante Justice, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1995, at 38.
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (West 1995). See also Montana, supra note 63, at
573 n.23 (detailing the three-tiered system of community notification adopted by New
Jersey).
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risk of reoffense, only law enforcement agencies are notified of his
presence in the community. 75 Second, if the offender poses a moder-
ate risk of reoffense, officials notify schools, religious groups, and
youth organizations in the community.76 Finally, if the offender poses
a high risk of reoffense, then individual residents in the community in
which the offender resides will be notified." Because "Megan's Law"
and other notification statutes call for community-wide notification in
78certain circumstances, sex offender community notification lawshave been subjected to significant constitutional challenges.79
B. Constitutional Challenges to Registration and Notification Laws
Sex offender registration and community notification laws have
been challenged on myriad federal and state constitutional grounds.8 °
75. Id. § 2C:7-8(c)(l).
76. Id. § 2C:7-8(c)(2).
77. Id. § 2C:7-8(c)(3).
78. Initially, "Megan's Law" called for-"community-wide notification in the case of
the most dangerous sex offenders." Lawrence Arnold, New Jersey & You This Week,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Sept. 17, 1995, at A3.
The Poritz court found, however, that such disclosure sufficiently impinged on
protected liberty interests in privacy and reputation so as to require due process
procedural safeguards prior to classification. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 420 (N.J.
1995). Additionally, the Poritz court noted the likelihood that community residents
would react to the information received on sex offenders with acts of vigilantism and
ostracism. Id. at 421.
State Attorney General Deborah Poritz, as instructed by the Poritz court, established
guidelines for "Megan's Law" providing, in part, for a "two-week window allowing
offenders to appeal notification decisions." Michelle Ruess, Megan's Law Notification
to Proceed; Exceptions Allowed in Three Cases, RECORD (Trenton, N.J.), July 28, 1995,
at A3. See infra parts 11.B.1 and 11.B.2 for further discussion of the Poritz decision.
Additionally, "notification through 'community meetings, speeches in schools, and
religious congregations"' was prohibited. Sanderson, supra note 69, at Al. Instead,
individuals determined "likely to encounter" the released sex offender will be notified of
an offender's presence in the community and, most importantly, will be asked to keep
such information confidential. Id. As defined by "Megan's Law" guidelines, "likely to
encounter" constitutes those people "in a location or in close geographic proximity to a
location which the offender visits or can be presumed to visit on a regular basis." Id.
This may include, but is not limited to, the sex offender's residence, place of
employment, or a drinking establishment. Id.
79. For a discussion of the constitutional concerns inherent in registration and
notification laws, see infra part II.B.1 and ll.B.2; see also infra note 80 and accompany-
ing text.
80. Some opponents have challenged the laws on the grounds that they constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., State v.
Douglas, 586 N.E.2d 1096, 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (arguing that Ohio's habitual
sex offender registration act violated the Eighth Amendment). Other opponents have
characterized the laws as violating a sex offender's right to privacy. See, e.g., People v.
Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that California's
registration statute did not impinge on the defendant's constitutional right to .privacy).
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Opponents of such laws most frequently argue that these laws consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment"i and violate the sex offender's
right to privacy.82 Despite these concerns, the majority of state regis-
tration and notification laws have withstood such constitutional
attacks.8 3
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." 4 To determine when the imposition of a law is cruel
and unusual and, hence, violates the Eighth Amendment, courts must
apply a two-part test. First, a court must determine whether the law
constitutes punishment.8 6 If the court finds that the law is a form of
punishment, the court then moves to the second part of the analysis
Opponents of community notification also claim that such a law violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See, e.g., State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244,
245 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the Minnesota sex offender registration law
was not an impermissible ex post facto law). In addition, the laws have been challenged
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., State
v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 1994) (holding that Washington's notification
and registration laws did not violate defendant's equal protection rights). Moreover,
opponents claim that sex offender community notification laws violate due process
guarantees found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., People v.
Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the statute
did not compel a defendant to testify against himself, nor did it deprive him of his right
to confront the victim). Finally, sex offender community notification laws have been
challenged on the grounds that they constitute double jeopardy, which is prohibited by
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404
(N.J. 1995) (rejecting argument that New Jersey's sex offender registration and
notification laws constitute double jeopardy).
81. See infra section II.B.I.
82. See infra section II.B.2.
83. 60 FED. REG. 18613 (1995) (stating that "a majority of courts that have dealt with
the issue have held that registration systems like those contemplated by the Jacob
Wetterling Act do not violate released offenders' constitutional rights").
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-03 (1958). This two-part test originated in
Trop where the United States Supreme Court offered a detailed analysis of the basic
concepts of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision. See id. at
101-03. See infra note 88 for a discussion of the Trop Court's analysis. See also
Houston, supra note 14, at 748 (stating that: "[A]n Eighth Amendment analysis of a Sex
Offender Registration Act will generally consist of two parts. First, the registration
requirement must be categorized as 'punishment,' and second, the punishment must be
evaluated under the current 'cruel and unusual' test.").
86. Houston, supra note 14, at 748. See also Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp.
666, 678 (D.N.J. 1995) (explaining that when analyzing "Megan's Law" under the cruel
and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment, "the [c]ourt must first
focus on whether the registration act passed by the New Jersey Legislature may be
categorized as 'punishment"').
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and determines whether the punishment is grossly disproportional to
the crime committed. 7
To determine whether a law is penal, rather than regulatory, the
United States Supreme Court requires courts to look at the purpose of
the statute. 8  In examining a statute's purpose, a court may initially
consider the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. 89 Even if the
court characterizes the legislative intent as non-penal, the court then
determines whether the actual effect of the statute is so punitive as to
negate the legislature's non-penal intent.9°
If a court finds the legislation to be penal in purpose or effect, it
must then determine whether the punishment is significantly dispro-
87. Houston, supra note 14, at 748. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this proportionality test. See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-
92 (1983) (detailing a three-part test to be employed when examining the
proportionality of a punishment to the related crime), overruled in part by Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). See infra note 92 for a discussion of how Harinelin
affects Solem; see infra part IV.A.I for an analysis of the Illinois sex offender
community notification law in light of the Solein decision.
88. Trop, 356 U.S. at 97-99. In Trop, the United States Supreme Court declared that a
law is penal if it imposes a disability for the purpose of punishment. Id. at 96. If a law
imposes a disability for some other legitimate governmental purpose, however, it is
non-penal and, therefore, removed from Eighth Amendment constitutional analysis. Id.
If a statute has both penal and non-penal effects, the statute will be declared non-penal
so long as the clear purpose of the legislation is of a regulatory nature. Id.
Some sex offender registration statutes have already been challenged under the Eighth
Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 533 (N.H. 1994) (finding New
Hampshire's sex offender registration law non-penal based on the legislative intent of
the statute to assist law enforcement agencies in their investigative procedures). See
also State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1994) (holding that Washington's sex
offender registration law does not constitute punishment).
89. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068. "To determine whether the sex offender registration
statute is punitive or regulatory, we look first to the Legislature's purpose in adopting
the law." Id.
90. Id. In addition to inquiring into the intentions of the legislature, the court must
"also examine whether the actual effect of the statute is so punitive as to negate the
Legislature's regulatory intent." Id. (emphasis omitted).
For assistance in analyzing the effect of a statute, courts have applied seven factors.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The seven factors a court
should use in determining whether a statute has penal or regulatory effects are as follows:
(I) whether the sanction entails an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether the
sanction has historically been regarded as punitive; (3) whether the sanction depends
upon a finding of scienter; (4) whether the sanction will operate to promote traditional
punishment objectives; (5) whether the sanction applies to behavior which is already a
crime; (6) whether there is an alternative non-punitive purpose for the sanction; and (7)
whether the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose. Id. These
factors focus "appropriate attention on the ... rationality between the [registration and
notification] requirement and its purported non-punitive function." State v. Noble, 829
P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ariz. 1992).
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portionate in relation to the crime. 9' In Solem v. Helm, 92 the United
States Supreme Court created a three-part test to be applied by courts
when determining proportionality. 93 According to the Solem Court, a
court should consider (1) "the gravity of the offense and harshness of
the penalty, [(2)] the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, [and (3)] the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions. 94
Opponents of sex offender registration and notification laws have
challenged both laws, arguing that they constitute punishment grossly
disproportionate to the crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 95
These critics assert that such statutes place a life-long stigma on the sex
offender. 96 Nonetheless, state courts have consistently held that sex
offender registration laws do not violate the Eighth Amendment's
91. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1980). "[O]utside the context of
capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence
are exceedingly rare." People v. Adams, 555 N.E.2d 761, 766 (111. App. Ct. 1990),
aff'd, 581 N.E.2d 637 (11). 1991) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90, overruled in part by
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)). "Moreover, reviewing courts should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crime." Adams, 555 N.E.2d at 768
(citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 290).
92. 463 U.S. 277 (1983), overruled in part by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991). In Harmelin, a highly divided court held, 5-4, that a life sentence for a drug
conviction was not "cruel and unusual" for Eighth Amendment purposes. Id. at 957. The
court split, however, on whether the Solem decision remained good law. Two Justices
argued that Solem should be overruled. Id. at 985. Three Justices voted to narrow the
scope of Solem, finding an Eighth Amendment violation only if the punishment was
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime. Id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Four
dissenting Justices voted to uphold Solemn. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting).
In light of the split over the current status of Solen, lower courts continue to apply the
decision in Eighth Amendment cases. Houston, supra note 14, at 752 n.139. Moreover,
"[a]lthough the Harmelin decision leaves the future of proportionality review somewhat
in doubt, the result reached by the majority of courts applying the Solemn test would not
change under Harmelin." Id.
93. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92.
94. Id. at 292.
95. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
96. Critics of registration and notification laws maintain that such laws mark a return
to the "scarlet letter laws" of colonial United States. Michelle P. Jerusalem, Note, A
Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention,
Registration, and The Public's "Right" to Know, 48 VAND. L. REV. 219, 224 (1995).
They argue that, similar to the scarlet "A" worn on the chest of adulteress Hester Prynne
in Nathaniel Hawthorne's book, The Scarlet Letter, sex offender registration and
community notification "brand" sex offenders for life and cause extreme humiliation as a
form of punishment. Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L. J. 1357, 1357. See also
Blacher, supra note 46, at 918 (noting that "[tihe practice of labeling a criminal with
symbols or words exposing the offense committed was used in colonial America as a
form of punishment by humiliation").
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.97 More than once,
however, courts have upheld registration requirements only after
noting that the laws did not provide for community notification.98
In Rowe v. Burton,99 for example, a federal district court
considered whether the state's registration and notification laws consti-
tuted punishment.'0° The court upheld both laws, but forbade the state
from disseminating the registrants' information to the public.'0 ' The
court implied that the disclosure of personal data under a notification
provision could stigmatize the sex offender and would therefore con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment. 0
2
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Doe v.
Poritz,0 3 rejected a similar argument that the State's sex offender com-
97. See, e.g., State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Manning,
532 N.W.2d 244, 248-49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1074
(Wash. 1994). The majority of the courts have determined that the law is regulatory and
not punitive in nature. See supra notes 88-90. As such, courts rarely move to the second
prong of the cruel and unusual punishment analysis. See, e.g., Noble, 829 P.2d at 1224
(determining that the sex offender registration statute did not constitute punishment
because its regulatory purpose outweighed its punitive purpose); Manning, 532 N.W.2d
at 248 (finding Minnesota's sex offender registration law to be non-punitive); Ward,
869 P.2d at 1074 (declaring that Washington's registration law does not constitute
punishment). But see In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal. 1983) (holding California's
registration law mandating registration of all misdemeanants, including sex offenders,
to be unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment, because it imposed a life-long
stigma that was not in proportion to the offender's crime).
98. See State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 533-344 (N.H. 1994) (holding New
Hampshire's sex offender registration law constitutional after indicating that a
notification law would inflict greater punishment than a simple registration
requirement); see also People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (II1. 1991) (holding that
Illinois' sex offender registration law, which does not permit public disclosure of the
data contained in the registry, does not constitute punishment). For a detailed
discussion of Adams, see infra part IlI.B.
99. 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994).
100. Id. at 1377-80.
101. Id. at 1388. In the context of a request for a preliminary injunction, the court
decided that "[p]laintiffs James Rowe and John Doe must register under ch. 41 SLA 1994,
provided, however, that defendants shall not disseminate the information concerning
James Rowe and John Doe received pursuant to registration to the public .. " Id.
102. Id. (noting that "but for the provision requiring public dissemination of
information, the Registration Act would likely withstand [constitutional] scrutiny...").
Id. at 1380. "[Plublic dissemination of information about a sex offender may elicit a
strong reaction which has unpleasant consequences for the offender. The public's
reaction . . . will result in embarrassment, harassment, ostracism, or worse. These
consequences may have a deterrent effect on offenders and may visit retribution on
registrants." Id. at 1379.
103. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). In Poritz, the plaintiff brought forth a variety of
constitutional claims in addition to the Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 380. The court
ruled against the plaintiff on all claims. Id. at 380-81, 387, 399, 412-13.
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munity notification law constituted cruel and unusual punishment.'0 4
In Poritz, the court stated that "Megan's Law" was not punitive, even
though it might carry a deterrent effect.'05 The court noted that the
purpose of the sex offender registration and community notification
laws was to protect society from the risk of further offenses by con-
victed sex offenders and not to inflict punishment. 0 6 Therefore, the
court held that the registration and community notification provisions
of the New Jersey law were non-penal and did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.'0 7
2. Right to Privacy
As one court has explained, "[t]he right to privacy under the United
States Constitution is well-recognized, though ill-defined."'' 0 8  In
essence, there are two types of privacy interests which arise under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 0 9 and Fourteenth"0 Amendments.
104. /I. at 405. In contrast, a federal district court in New Jersey determined that
"Megan's Law" imposed a stigma on sex offenders, constituted punishment, and violated
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876
F. Supp 666, 689, 692 (D. N.J. 1995). Nonetheless, while the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit currently reviews "Megan's Law," the sex offender
community notification provision remains in effect. Woo, supra note 69, at 17A. The
appeal to the Third Circuit specifically focuses "on the issue of whether community
notification amounts to extra punishment for sex offenders who have already paid for
their crimes." Art Weissman & Laurence Arnold, New Jersey & You This Week, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Oct. 22, 1995, at A3.
105. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 405. "The fact that some deterrent punitive impact may
result does not ... transform those provisions into 'punishment' ...." Id.
106. Id. at 404 (noting that "[i]t is not intended as punishment but rather is a
consequence that is simply unavoidable, for it goes to the very heart of the remedy: that
which is allegedly punitive, the knowledge of the offender's record and identity, is
precisely what is needed for the protection of the public").
107. Id. at 404-05. Nonetheless, because of concerns expressed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Poritz, notification must be confined to those members and
organizations in the public "likely to encounter" the offender. Id. at 384. Additionally,
those notified of a sex offender's presence in the community must keep such information
confidential. Id. See also supra note 78 (briefly discussing the changes imposed by the
new guidelines to "Megan's Law").
108. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (D. Alaska 1994) (citing National
Treasury Employees Union v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 242 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
109. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part that "[n]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
110. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in
pertinent part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
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The first component concerns an individual's interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters."' The second component protects an
individual's interest in making important and intimate decisions regard-
ing fundamental issues." 2
In order for an individual to assert either component of the privacy
interest in a due process claim, he must demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the particular area. 1 3 If a court finds the
existence of such an expectation, the court must then determine
whether the state law violates that expectation; if a violation is found,
the court next examines if there is a state interest that justifies the
infringement of the individual's right.' 4 When analyzing whether the
registration and community notification laws violate a sex offender's
right to privacy, a court must first determine whether the sex offender
can establish a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the infor-
mation that is contained in the registry or disclosed under notification
laws." 5 When considering registration requirements, courts have con-
sistently maintained that the sex offender, as a convicted felon, has a
reduced expectation of privacy, if any at all." 6 This position stems
from the fact that the matters in consideration-the sex offenders'
criminal records-are already available to the public." 7
I l I. Houston, supra note 14, at 762. This type of privacy right is evidenced in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would require
queries into intimate aspects of the marital relationship).
1 12. Houston, supra note 14, at 762 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973))
(holding that a pregnant woman has a fundamental privacy interest in seeking an
abortion).
I1 3. Rowe, 884 F. Supp at 1384. Therefore, neither privacy right can be asserted
against matters already considered to be a part of the public domain. Id. at 1384.
114. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995).
115. Id. at 406.
1 16. See, e.g., Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1384 (explaining that the privacy right "does
not attach to matters already within the public domain"); People v. Adams, 555 N.E.2d
761, 768 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Law
did not implicate the sex offender's right to privacy because the registrant's personal
information remained confidential), aff'd, 581 N.E.2d 637 (111. 1991); Poritz, 662 A.2d
at 407 (stating that "[ilnformation that is readily available to the public, which an
individual cannot expect to remain private, is not within the ambit of constitutional
protection").
117. See Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 689 (D.N.J. 1995) (stating that
"[i]t has long been a facet of United States law that criminal records should be available
to . . . public . . . scrutiny and investigation. Such criminal records normally would
include an individual's name, address, the nature of his crime and conviction and the
period for which he was imprisoned therefor [sic]").
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While registration laws have not been found to violate the offenders'
right to privacy," 18 notification laws may not so easily withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny. For instance, in Poritz, the court held that certain
aspects of New Jersey's community notification provision impinged
on-a sex offender's privacy interests." 9 The Poritz court determined
that while the state infringed upon a sex offender's privacy interest by
disseminating in a packaged form, various pieces of the registrant's
personal history, 20 the state's strong interest in protecting its citizens
through public disclosure substantially outweighed the sex offender's
privacy interest.' 2' The Poritz court concluded that the broad-based
notification provision of "Megan's Law" significantly furthered the
state goal of protecting its citizens from acts of sexual violence and
therefore did not violate the sex offender's right to privacy. 1
22
III. DISCUSSION
Illinois has enacted both child sex offender registration and
notification laws. The Illinois General Assembly adopted the registra-
tion act in 1986,23 and has since amended the law several times. 24 In
118. See, e.g., Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1384 (finding that the plaintiffs could not
"establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information" contained in the sex
offender registry); People v. Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(determining that even though California's sex offender registration law implicates the
sex offender's right to privacy, the state's interest in promoting safety outweighs the
sex offender's interests).
119. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 411.
120. Id. "Megan's Law" mandates the disclosure of the registrant's name,
appearance, address, and crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 7-4(b)(l)-(3) (West 1995).
The Poritz court explained:
[The notification law] eliminates the costs . . . that members of the public
would incur in assembling the information themselves. Those costs,
however, may severely limit the extent to which the information becomes a
matter of public knowledge. The Notification Law therefore exposes various
bits of information that, although accessible to the public, may remain
obscure.
Poritz, 662 A.2d at 411.
121. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 41 1. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 412. The court detailed the potency of the state's interest:
Counterbalanced against plaintiff's diminished privacy interest is a strong
state interest in public disclosure. There is an express public policy
militating toward disclosure: the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders.
The state interest in protecting the safety of members of the public from sex
offenders is clear and compelling . . . . The Legislature has determined that
there is a substantial danger of recidivism by sex offenders, and public
notification clearly advances the purpose of protecting the public from that
danger.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, Pub. Act No. 84-1279, 1986 Ill.
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1991 the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Adams,'25 held that the
registration law was constitutional under the Illinois and United States
Constitutions. 126 As a result of the tragic murder of Christopher
Meyer, the Illinois General Assembly also enacted a sex offender
notification law in 1995.127 This Part discusses the development of the
registration law in Illinois and the shift toward promoting a sex of-
fender notification law.
A. The Development of the Sex Offender Registration Law in Illinois
In reaction to a proliferation of sex crimes against children, the
Illinois General Assembly adopted the Habitual Child Sex Offender
Registration Act (the "Habitual Registration Act") in 1986.128 The
Habitual Registration Act mandated the registration of all sex offenders
convicted of at least two sex crimes where the victim was under the
age of eighteen. 129 The General Assembly intended for the Habitual
Registration Act to aid law enforcement agencies in protecting the chil-
dren of Illinois from repeat sex offenders. 3 ° By requiring sex
offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies, sex offender
registration laws assist law enforcement personnel in expeditiously
locating child molesters.' 3
The 1986 version of the Illinois registration law, however, proved
to provide insufficient protection against child molesters. 3 2 In 1992,
Laws 1467 (codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 150/1-10 (West
Supp. 1995) (amended 1995).
124. See infra part Ill.A.
125. 581 N.E.2d 637 (111. 1991).
126. Id. at 644.
127. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
128. HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Ist Sess. 208 (June 23, 1986).
Representative Terry Parke, as sponsor of the bill, explained that the bill provides
"another tool in protecting our children." House Panel Cracks Down on Child Sex
Abuse, UPI, June 14, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
129. Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act, Pub. Act No. 84-1279, Art. 1, § 2, 1986
I1l. Laws 1467 (codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 150/1-10
(West Supp. 1995) (amended 1995)). See infra note 134.
130. HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 84th II. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. 209 (June 23, 1986).
"[T]his kind of legislation will help our law enforcement agencies stop this kind of
carnage on our children. Society demands that we protect out [sic] children." Id.
131. See People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640 (I11. 1991) (explaining that "[w]ith
the registration requirement, the . . . offender's address is readily available to law
enforcement agencies, which may then question and, if necessary, detain him under
appropriate circumstances"). See also State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Ariz. 1992)
(noting that "[r]egistration is 'a valuable tool in the hands of the police, because it
gives them a current record of the identity and location of ex-felons"') (quoting
Atteberry v. State, 438 P.2d 789, 791 (Nev. 1968)).
132. Senator Alan J. Dixon, advocating an amendment to the Habitual Registration
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public outcry against the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a
six-year-old girl in Illinois inspired the General Assembly to expand
the coverage of the Habitual Registration Act. 133 The amended Child
Sex Offender Registration Act 34 required the registration of all child
sex offenders upon their first conviction. 35
The Child Sex Offender Registration Act ("Registration Act") pro-
vides certain procedures that courts and law enforcement personnel
must follow after a child sex offender is first convicted. 36  Upon
conviction of a first sex offense against a minor, the court must certify
the defendant as a "child sex offender."' 137 Subsequently, the child sex
offender learns of his obligation to register from the court that con-
victed him, 138 as well as the facility that releases or paroles him. 39 A
child sex offender must then register with the local police chief thirty
days before moving into the county in which he plans to reside. 40 If
the registrant moves, he must inform the law enforcement agency of
his new address within ten days.' 4' The sex offender must also sign a
Act, explained that "'[o]ur children are not adequately protected under current law from
this crime. We need to provide better protection for our children."' Sen. Dixon
Introduces Kahla Lansing Child Protection Act of 1991, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 26, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File [hereinafter Sen. Dixon].
133. SENATE PROCEEDINGS, 87th III. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. 52 (June 18, 1992)
("House Bill 2736... arises out of the tragic kidnapping and murder of Kahla Lansing in
Spring Valley this past year.").
Six-year-old Kahla Lansing disappeared on September 28, 1991. Matt Murray, Fate of
Girl's Killer Goes to Another County, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1992, § 2, at 5. Police
discovered Kahla's body two weeks later in an abandoned grain storage bin in eastern
Iowa. Id. Twenty-nine-year-old Jeffrey Rissley admitted to kidnapping Kahla,
molesting her, and finally strangling her with an electrical cord. Id. Rissley had
previously served time in a Texas prison following conviction on two counts of child
molestation in that state. Sen. Dixon, supra note 132. Moreover, Rissley sexually
assaulted another child in Galesburg, Illinois before kidnapping Kahla. Id.
134. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/1-10 (West Supp. 1995) (amended 1995).
135. Id. § 150/2 (amended 1995). Under the Habitual Registration Act, a child sex
offender did not have to register until after his second conviction. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, 221-30 (West 1987). See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
137. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/2 (amended 1995). Specifically, §
150/2(A) provides in part that "[ulpon conviction the court shall certify that the person
is a 'child sex offender' and shall include the certification in the order of commitment."
Id. (amended 1995).
138. Id. § 150/5 (amended 1995).
139. Id. § 150/4 (amended 1995).
140. Id. § 150/3 (amended 1995). Section 150/3 also states that "in the event no
police chief exists or if he resides in an unincorporated area he shall register with the
sheriff of the county." Id. (amended 1995).
141. Id. § 150/6 (amended 1995). After receiving this information, "[tihe law en-
forcement agency shall, within 3 days of receipt, forward the information to the Depart-
ment of State Police and to the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction of the new
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statement and provide specific information as requested by the Depart-
ment of State Police. 42 Under the Act, the law enforcement agency
must keep this information confidential. 14
3
If the sex offender fails to register, he will be guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor.' 44 If the child sex offender does not commit another
sex offense, however, his registration requirement expires after tenyears. 4'
In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly further modified the state's
registration act, requiring all convicted sex offenders-not just those
who commit sex crimes against children-to register with the proper
law enforcement agency. 46 Furthermore, the amendment expanded
the definition of a sex offender by characterizing an additional eight
criminal acts as sexual offenses. 47 The amendment also requires the
registrant to report in person to the proper law enforcement agency
once a year in order to verify the information on file.
48
place of residence." Id. (amended 1995).
142. Id. § 150/8 (amended 1995). This information may include "the fingerprints
and photograph of the person." Id. (amended 1995).
143. Id. § 150/9 (amended 1995). Section 150/9 prohibits the inspection of this in-
formation by the public. Id. (amended 1995). The unauthorized release of the regis-
trant's personal information constitutes a Class B misdemeanor. Id. (amended 1995).
144. Id. § 150/10 (amended 1995). Section 150/10 states that "[any person who is
required to register under this Article who violates any of the provisions thereof is guilty
of a Class A misdemeanor." Id. (amended 1995).
145. Id. § 150/7 (amended 1995).
146. Sex Offender Registration Act, Pub. Act No. 89-8, Art. 20, § 20-20, 1995 111.
Legis. Serv. 286 (West) (to be codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730,
§§150/-10). This bill became effective January I, 1996 pursuant to ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 5, § 75/i (West 1992) (amended 1995).
By expanding the registration law to include adult sex offenders, the Illinois General
Assembly brought Illinois' registration law into compliance with the Crimes Against
Children Act. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. In so doing, the General
Assembly ensured that Illinois' federal crime fighting funds would not be reduced. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
147. Pub. Act No. 89-8, Art. 20, § 20-20, 1995 Il. Legis. Serv. 286 (West) (to be
codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/2).
Specifically, the new law added the following eight crimes, in comparison to the 1992
version of the Child Sex Offender Registration Act: indecent solicitation of a child, sex-
ual exploitation of a child, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute, patronizing a juvenile
prostitute, keeping a place of juvenile prostitution, juvenile pimping, exploitation of a
child, and ritualized abuse of a child. Id. (to be codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 730, § 150/2).
148. Id. (West) (to be codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §
150/6). As of January 1, 1996, Section 6 of ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 730, § 150 states in
part that "[a]ny person required to register under this Article shall report in person to the
appropriate law enforcement agency with whom he or she last registered one year from
the date of that registration and every year thereafter." Id. (to be codified as amended at
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/6).
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Significantly, the new law applies retroactively, whereas the earlier
version did not. 49 Additionally, the new law specifically addresses
the issue of juvenile sex offenders.150 Finally, the new law increases
the severity of punishment for a sex offender's failure to register.'5'
B. Challenge to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Law:
People v. Adams 52
On December 2, 1987, a DuPage County criminal court convicted
Daniel Adams of his second sex crime, perpetrated against his then
149. Id. (to be codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/3).
Applying the registration law retroactively has been upheld as constitutional in
Illinois. People v. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d 4, 7 (III. App. Ct. 1995). In Starnes, the
appellate court held that the Child Sex Offender Registration Act could be applied to a
sex offender convicted before the enactment of the law without violating any consti-
tutional provisions. Id. at 7. The court found that even though the defendant, at the time
of his offense, was subject only to the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, the
retroactive application of the Child Sex Offender Registration Act was permissible. Id.
150. Pub. Act No. 89-8, Art. 20, § 20-20, 1995 I11. Legis. Serv. 286 (West) (to be
codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/2). In contrast to the 1992
version of the Child Registration Act, the amended act applies to juvenile sex offenders
when they are adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. Id. (to be codified as amended at
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/3).
151. Id. (to be codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/10). A
sex offender who fails to register "is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense
and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense." Id. (to be codified as amended
at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/10). In addition, the sex offender will "be
required to serve a minimum period of 7 days confinement in the local county jail." Id.
(to be codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 150/10).
152. 581 N.E.2d 637 (I11. 1991). The Adams decision is not the first in Illinois to
address various aspects of the Illinois sex offender registration laws. See, e.g., People
v. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d 4, 7 (III. App. Ct. 1995) (upholding the retroactive application
of the Child Sex Offender Registration Act); People v. Calahan, 649 N.E.2d 588, 593
(111. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that defendant was properly certified as a child sex offender
under the Child Sex Offender Registration Act after his first conviction of a sexual
offense); People v. Doyle, 578 N.E.2d 15, 17-19 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (determining that,
even though the sex offender pled guilty to two offenses at the same time, the offenses
were separate and, therefore, subjected the sex offender to certification under the Habitual
Registration Act); People v. Murphy, 565 N.E.2d 1359, 1360 (I11. App. Ct. 1991)
(holding that "[b]ecause certification is a collateral consequence of a defendant's convic-
tion for a sex offense against a child rather than a penalty or an enhancement of the sen-
tence, courts are not prohibited from certifying a defendant after his sentence has been
imposed"); People v. Taylor, 561 N.E.2d 393, 394 (Il. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied,
567 N.E.2d 340 (I11. 1991) (concluding that "a court which fails to do its administrative
duty [of certifying the defendant as an habitual child sex offender] under the [Illinois Ha-
bitual Registration] Act at the time of sentencing does not lose jurisdiction to perform
the function in the future"); People v. Rogers, 555 N.E.2d 53, 55 (I11. App. Ct. 1990)
(agreeing with the plaintiff sex offender's contention that "a conviction of criminal sex-
ual abuse, or a 'substantially equivalent' statutory predecessor to criminal sexual abuse,
is not a 'sex offense' under the [Habitual Registration] statute unless it is a felony").
The Adams case, however, is the only case to reach the Illinois Supreme Court.
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twelve-year-old daughter.5 3 Aside from sentencing Adams to prison,
the court certified the defendant as an habitual child sex offender
pursuant to the then current Habitual Registration Act."5 Adams ap-
pealed to the Illinois Appellate Court arguing, among other things,- 5
that the Habitual Registration Act violated the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment provisions of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions.5 6 The
appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Supreme
Court of Illinois granted review.5 7
The Illinois Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts' holdings,
determined that the duty to register under the Habitual Registration Act
did not constitute punishment. 58 Therefore, the court concluded that
the Habitual Registration Act did not violate either the United States or
the Illinois Constitutions. 59 The court first examined the General
Assembly's intent when enacting the statute' 6 and found that the Gen-
eral Assembly clearly intended for the act to be regulatory instead of
penal.'
61
The court continued its analysis assuming, arguendo, that the
Habitual Registration Act was penal in nature. 62 The court considered
Adams' claim that the Habitual Registration Act conferred a public
stigma upon him, which constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 63
153. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 639. Adams had been previously convicted in
Stephenson County for aggravated criminal sexual abuse.against his daughter in 1985.
Id.
154. Id.
155. Adams also claimed that the Habitual Registration Act violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § I I
of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 640. Moreover, Adams argued that the trial court
certified him as a habitual child sex offender in an untimely manner. Id.
156. Id. at 640. See supra notes 80 and 95 and accompanying text.
157. Id. at 639-40.
158. Id. at 641.
159. Id. The court stated, with respect to the federal claim, that "[t]he disability fails
to meet the guidelines set forth for determining what constitutes punishment. For these
reasons, the Registration Act does not constitute punishment under the [E]ighth
[A]mendment." Id. Regarding Adams's state claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the
court ruled that because the registration requirement was not disproportionate to other
state penalties, it did not violate the Illinois Constitution. Id.
160. Id. at 640-41. This is required in any cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
See supra part ll.B. I for a discussion of the constitutional analysis in light of a cruel and
unusual punishment challenge.
161. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640. "Specifically, the legislature sought to create an
additional method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual
assault and sexual abuse." Id. (citing HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 84th I11. Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. 208 (June 23, 1986)).
162. Id. at 641.
163. Id. ("Defendant argues the statute is cruel in that it places a stigma upon him
after his debt to society has been paid through incarceration."). See supra notes 96-97
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In dicta, the court explained that the stigma resulted only from com-
munity notification, and not from mere registration. 6M  Significantly,
the court implied that the dissemination of such information to com-
munity residents could attach a stigma to the sex offender, and might
therefore violate the Eighth Amendment because the punishment would
be disproportionate to the crime committed. 65
C. The Development of the Child Sex Offender
Notification Law In Illinois
Several Illinois legislators recently proposed bills for the adoption of
a sex offender notification law in Illinois. 66 Efforts to pass similar
notification laws in Illinois in the past had proven unsuccessful.'67
Nonetheless, influenced by the recent and tragic murder of Christopher
Meyer, as well as the public outrage which followed, Illinois law-
makers passed a notification law. 168 Governor Edgar signed the Child
Sex Offender Community Notification Act ("Community Notification
and accompanying text for a discussion of the sex offender stigma.
164. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641. The Court specifically stated:
The existence of 'stigma' requires that the knowledge of the registrant's past
transgressions be conveyed to the general public. Since it is a criminal
offense for law enforcement officials to convey this information to the public,
it is unlikely the information the registrant supplies will be distributed to the
public, and so no stigma attaches.
Id.
165. Id. See infra part IV.A.! for an analysis of the impact of the Adams decision
with respect to a constitutional challenge to the Illinois Child Sex Offender Community
Notification Act.
166. On October 20, 1995, the House Republicans and the House Democrats
introduced into the Illinois State General Assembly H.B. 2517, 89th I11. Gen. Assem.,
Veto Sess. (1995), and H.B. 2525, 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Veto Sess. (1995),
respectively, proposing the use of sex offender community notification laws. 1995 IL.
H.B. 2517, 2525, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, ILTRCK File.
167. Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at 1. For example, Senator Timothy Dunn
introduced the Senate Democrat sex offender community notification bill on March 3,
1995, during the first session of the 89th General Assembly in the Spring of 1995. S.
886, 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Ist Sess. (1995). However, Senator Dunn's bill was "never
heard in Judiciary and re-referred to the Senate Rules Committee." Telephone Interview
with Michael A. Marrs, Senate Democratic Staff, Illinois General Assembly (Oct. 25,
1995).
1 68. Kevin McDermott, Bill Would Expose Sex Offenders; GOP Ties Cleanup Fee to
Popular Measure, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 1995, at ID. See supra notes 16,
45-46 and accompanying text. The director of the Illinois American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") stated that "[ilt is very probable that a bill [concerning sex offender
notification] will pass during the veto session-November 1-3 and 14-16." Letter from
Mary Dixon, Legislative Chapter Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois,
to Jessica Ball, Senior Member, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal (Oct. 4, 1995)
(on file with author).
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Act") into law on December 13, 1995.169 The law becomes effective
on June 1, 1996.170
The Community Notification Act reached its final form after under-
going several dramatic revisions. The original bill, introduced by
House Republicans, was substantially amended17' before unanimously
being passed by the House. 72 The Illinois Senate incorporated the bill
into a larger anti-crime package found in Senate Bill 721.173 Before
169. Christi Parsons, Edgar OKs Eavesdropping on Calls, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1995,
at Al.
170. Corrections-Child Sex Offender Notification Law, Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995
I11. Legis Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§
152/101-130). Hereinafter, the Illinois Child Sex Offender Community Notification Act
will be referred to as the Community Notification Act.
17 1. The original House Bill 2517, similar to the New Jersey law, provided for three
tiers of community notification based on an analysis of the sex offender's risk of
reoffense. H.B. 2517. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this aspect of "Megan's Law." In addition, the original Bill required the Department of
State Police to devise the method by which the sex offender's risk should be assessed.
H.B. 2517. Furthermore, the original Bill offered immunity against liability for
individuals who inadvertently gave too much (or too little) information to the
community. Id.
172. David Heckelman, House OKs Notice Law Covering Sex Offenders, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Nov. 3, 1995, at I. House Bill 2517 provided for the Child Sex Offender
Community Notification Act. H.B. 2517 (amended, Nov. 3, 1995). The Bill, as
amended and passed by the House only, applied notification provisions only to sex
offenders whose victims were under 18 at the time of the offense. Id. Also, the amended
Bill eliminated the tiers of notification, as set forth in the Bill's original form. Id.
Instead, the amended Bill required that the Department of State Police distribute the
names and addresses of all child sex offenders subject to the Community Notification Act
to the Department of Children and Family Services, public and private school officials,
and child care facilities. Id. Additionally, the amended Bill authorized any law
enforcement agency to disclose information contained in the registry to any person that
the agency believed was "likely to encounter" a child sex offender. Id. For an example
of one state's definition of "likely to encounter," see supra note 78. Moreover, the
amendment required that a registry of offenders subject to the new law be made available
for inspection by any person who made a request in person, in writing, or by telephone.
H.B. 2517 (amended, Nov. 3, 1995).
The amended Bill also provided that community notification under House Bill 2517
applied retroactively to child sex offenders who committed offenses prior to the
enactment of House Bill 2517. Id. Furthermore, the amended Bill mandated registration
of both juvenile and insane sex offenders. Id. Finally, the amended Bill modified the
Juvenile Court Act's confidentiality provisions by authorizing the disclosure of juvenile
child sex offenders' registry information. Id.
173. Heckelman, supra note 172, at 1. According to the Senate rules, House Bill
2517 arrived too late in the Senate to be considered independently in the veto session.
Bill Bush, Child Sex Offender Bill Could be Tacked onto Gas Tank Plan, ST. J.-REG.
(Springfield, II1.) Nov. 15, 1995, at 3.
The Senate Bill incorporated a variety of other measures. For instance, the Bill
requires the movement of teen-aged juveniles to adult courts for the commission of sex-
related murders and carjacking, and permits parole hearings to be held every three years
rather than annually. S. 721; Rick Pearson & Christi Parsons, GOP Wraps Sex Offenders
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passing the bill, however, the Senate amended the sex offender notifi-
cation portion of the legislation.
7 4
The new Community Notification Act complements the Registration
Act by allowing information about sex offenders, already available to
law enforcement officials under the Registration Act, to also be given
to certain members of the community. 175 The new law, however, does
not apply to all of the sex offenders who must comply with the
Registration Act. The notification law defines a "child sex offender"
as a sex offender who commits an offense listed in the Registration Act
against a person under the age of eighteen. 76 The notification law
also, however, excludes four of those offenses from its definition. 77
As a result, offenders who commit kidnapping, aggravated kidnap-
ping, unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint, must regis-
ter with the police under the Registration Act, but are not subject to
community notification under the new law. 178
The Community Notification Act requires local law enforcement
agencies to notify the Department of Children and Family Services, as
well as child care facilities and school officials, that a sex offender has
moved into their community. 179 In addition, law enforcement agencies
must tell these officials not only the sex offender's name and address,
and Gas Tanks into I Bill, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1995, § 2, Metro Chicago, at 1. The
Bill also alters mandatory minimum sentences for teen-aged juveniles convicted of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnapping.
David Heckelman, Senate OKs Bill Linking Crime Measures, Storage Tank Repairs, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 16, 1995, at 1. Finally, the Bill amends legislation affecting the
Leaking Underground Storage Tank ("LUST"') fund. McDermott, supra note 168, at ID.
174. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
175. Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 111. Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/101-130).
176. Id. (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/105). The new
definition for child sex offender under the notification law cites to the Registration Act,
which was amended in the same public act that created the notification law. Id. (to be
codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/101-130) (citing ILL COMP STAT. ANN.
ch. 730 §150/2 (West Supp. 1995) (amended by Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 111. Legis.
Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/101-130))).
177. Compare Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 I11 Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified
at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/105) with ILL COMP STAT. ANN. ch. 730 §150/2
(West Supp. 1995) (amended by Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 111. Legis. Serv. 4039
(West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/101-130)).
178. See supra note 177.
179. Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 I11 Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/101-130). The new law states that local law
enforcement agencies will create their own procedures for public inspection of the child
sex offender registries. Id. Furthermore, the Community Notification Law enlarges the
immunity clause contained in House Bill 2517, which gave immunity only to officials
who mistakenly revealed information, by removing the provision allowing liability for
the willful and wanton acts of law enforcement officials. Id.; see supra note 171.
430 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
but also the nature of the offense for which the child sex offender was
convicted'8 Finally, community notification under the new law must
cease ten years after the sex offender first registers pursuant to the
Registration Act.' 8'
IV. ANALYSIS
With the enactment of the Community Notification Act, Illinois'
courts and communities will be forced to address several issues. First,
the new Community Notification Act raises important constitutional
concerns. 82 Based on the Illinois and New Jersey Supreme Court
decisions in People v. Adams'83 and Doe v. Poritz, 84 respectively, it
remains uncertain whether Illinois' Community Notification Act vio-
lates the cruel and unusual punishment 85 and right to privacy protec-
180. Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 I1 Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 152/120 and 152/125).
181. Id. (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 152/101-130). The
Community Notification Law does not alter the ten year duration requirement of the Sex
Offender Registration Act. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
182. Arguably, the Community Notification Act raises the following constitutional
arguments: cruel and unusual punishment, right to privacy, ex post facto, due process,
equal protection, and double jeopardy. See supra note 80. This Comment's
constitutional analysis is limited to whether the Community Notification Act violates
either the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision or the privacy
interests inherent in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because these two
constitutional challenges appear to be the most viable.
Nonetheless, the Community Notification Act as enacted implicates particular
constitutional concerns not addressed in this article. First, because the Community
Notification Act does not provide an opportunity for the sex offender to challenge the
breadth of disclosure, the offender's procedural due process rights may be violated. See
supra note 78. Mary Dixon of the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois explained,
with respect to a three-tiered notification policy, that "[w]ithout an appeals process for
offenders who believe they have been wrongly ranked .... the bill would violate due-
process requirements." Kevin McDermott, Panel May Endorse Sex Offender Registry;
Specifics Hazy on Bill to Expose Sex Criminals to Neighbors in Illinois, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1995, at IA. Second, the Community Notification Act also
might impinge on the sex offender's due process rights because it does not provide
notice of the registration requirement to the sex offender who is convicted of a sex
offense prior to the bill's enactment. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
229 (1957) (holding that the registration provisions, as applied to the defendant,
violated the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment where it appeared
that the defendant had no actual knowledge of the requirement to register under the
ordinance). Additionally, because the Community Notification Act applies retro-
actively, it raises ex post facto constitutional concerns. See supra note 61.
183. 581 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. 1991).
184. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
185. See infra part IV.A.I. See also Parsons & Kass, supra note 7, at I (reporting
that even though Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan believes that the proposed
community notification laws are defensible, "he isn't certain that they would be upheld
in the courts").
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tions found in the United States Constitution. 8 6 Secondly, the imple-
mentation of community notification in Illinois may have pragmatic
effects that would work to undermine the purpose of the statute. 8 7 As
a result, community notification may not be an effective way to protect
the children of Illinois, as well as other community members, from sex
offenders.'
A. Constitutional Concerns About the Illinois Child Sex Offender
Community Notification Act
This section analyzes two critical constitutional challenges to com-
munity notification laws: cruel and unusual punishment 89 and right to
privacy. 90
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
When analyzing whether the Community Notification Act violates
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision, the
court must apply a two-pronged test.' 9' First, a court must determine
whether the notification provision constitutes punishment. 92 If a court
finds the provision to be punitive, it must then examine whether the
Community Notification Act is grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed.'9 ' After applying this test, it is evident that Illinois' Com-
munity Notification Act potentially violates the Eighth Amendment.
With respect to the first prong, both the sex offender and the State
can present forceful arguments. A sex offender could argue that com-
munity notification generates such public stigma and ostracism that it
must be viewed as punitive.' 94 Additionally, the sex offender could
stress that the deterrence and public retribution factors weigh heavily in
favor of characterizing the law as punishment.' 95 Conversely, the
State could maintain that the law is regulatory and intended solely to
186. See infra part IV.A.2.
187. See infra part IV.B.
188. See infra part lV.B and V.
189. See supra part I.B.1.
190. See supra part 1l.B.2.
191. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two-part
test employed in Eighth Amendment analyses.
192. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
194. Fred Cohen, From the Editor: Sex Offender Registration Laws; Constitutional
and Policy Issues, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 151, 153 (Mar./Apr. 1995). See supra note 96.
195. Cohen, supra note 194, at 153 ("[Wlhile registration and public notice may not
historically be viewed as punishment, deterrence and retribution factors that are present
weigh in favor of characterizing the impact as punishment.").
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protect the community.' 96 Even if the law infringes upon the rights of
the sex offender, the State could further claim that such hardship is
incidental to community notification and does not constitute punish-
ment.' 97
Even though the state's arguments are compelling, the Illinois courts
should characterize the Community Notification Act as punishment. In
Adams, the Illinois Supreme Court strongly suggested that the stigma
accompanying public disclosure might qualify as punishment. 98
Based on that court's analysis, it is probable that a lower court will
follow Adams and conclude that community notification is punitive. 99
In determining proportionality under the second prong of the cruel
and unusual punishment analysis, the United States Supreme Court
has stated that a court should consider several factors. 2° Although a
subsequent Supreme Court decision cast the status of these factors into
doubt, lower courts continue to apply them in Eighth Amendment
cases. 20' In this analysis, the court must take into consideration the
stigma associated with community notification when determining the
harshness of the punishment.
The court must first compare the gravity of the sex offense to the
severity of the penalty. 0 2 When considering the penalty involved in
sex offender community notification, it is clear that public disclosure
creates adverse problems in the community such as vigilantism and
community migration. 23 Specifically, sex offender community notifi-
cation laws not only raise public awareness, they also heighten com-
196. Id. ("[A] post offense registration law is regulatory and protective of the
community.").
197. Id. ("[A]ny harm to the registrant is incidental but certainly not punishment.").
198. See supra part III.B. If the law is characterized as regulatory, however, it is
likely that the court will determine that the law is non-penal in nature. See supra notes
88-90 and accompanying text. As such, the court might end its discussion in the first
prong of the cruel and unusual punishment analysis, and conclude that the law does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
199. This analysis is consistent with that of the district court in Artway v. Attorney
Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995). In Artway, the court determined that New
Jersey's notification law actually placed a stigma on the sex offender which amounted to
punishment. Id. at 689. The court explained that "the social stigma attached to any
form of branding, whether for criminal offense, moral indiscretion, religious belief, or
the mere fact of being different, has historically been a lifelong albatross around the
necks of those so branded." Id.
200. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983), overruled in part by Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). See supra note 92 for a discussion of the continued
relevance of these factors.
201. See supra note 92.
202. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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munity anger and lawlessness.. 4 Often, after learning that a sex
offender is within their midst, community members take it upon
themselves to punish and intimidate the offender, the offender's
friends, and his family. 20 5 For example, after being informed of sex
offender Joseph Gallardo's imminent release from prison and intent to
return to his home in Snohomish County, Washington, community
members burned his house to the ground. 206 Similarly, after Megan
Kanka's death in New Jersey, residents threw stones at the sex
offender's roommates. 20
7
In effect, these acts of vigilantism ostracize sex offenders and force
them to leave their communities. °8 In particular, financially sound,
204. Montana, supra note 63, at 577-78 ("Community notification laws heighten
community fears concerning the threat of convicted sex offenders and create an
environment that is ripe for acts of vigilantism.").
205. Martone, supra note 73, at 39. For example, sex offender Paul Wood moved
from his home after being harassed by his neighbors. Montana, supra note 63, at 580
n.49. Community members honked their car horns whenever they drove past his home,
and shined their headlights into his house at night. Id.
206. Anderson, supra note 38, at 1. See also Blacher, supra note 46, at 914-15
(explaining that after child molester Joseph Gallardo's picture and description as an
"extremely dangerous untreated sex offender" were distributed, members of the
community in which he intended to live burned down Gallardo's home). Likewise, two
community members pushed their way into a Phillipsburg, New Jersey, home in search
of 25-year-old Michael Groff, a paroled sex offender. Martone, supra note 73, at 39.
"They knew he was staying there because police had notified the community of his
whereabouts under the new law. The intruders announced they were looking for 'the child
molester' and then began beating the wrong man." Id. Moreover, in Timberlane,
Washington, community members threw eggs at the home of a sex offender's
grandparents. Montana, supra note 63, at 579 n.46. The family also received death
threats. Id.
207. Montana, supra note 63, at 579 n.46.
208. Houston, supra note 14, at 745. For example, convicted sex offender Martin
Bruce has been run out of three communities since he was released from prison.
Montana, supra note 63, at 582 n.55. Similarly, after losing three jobs when his
employers learned that he was a sex offender, John Curtis Peterson decided to move out
of Washington. Id. at 582 n.54. Likewise, David Lewis lost his construction job in
New Jersey after the community learned of his past; he moved to a state which does not
have a sex offender community notification law. Id.
Some commentators have recognized that "[c]ommunity notification laws create 'a
wandering nomadic tribe of sex offenders who go from town to town seeking anonymity
to avoid negative repercussions when people find out they're in the community."' Id. at
581 n.51 (quoting Fred J. Aun, Paroled Sex Offender an 'Unwelcome' Sight, STAR
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 16, 1994, at 1). See also Jerusalem, supra note 96, at 247
n.178 (supporting the theory that publicly labeling a sex offender may result in "'the
actor becoming extremely entrenched . . . in the role of the deviant,"' and that "'being
publicly declared deviant serves to perpetuate one's deviant conduct."') (quoting ERDWIN
H. PFUHL, JR. THE DEVIANT PROCESS 130 (1986); Martone, supra note 73, at 39
(explaining that when sex offenders run from public disclosure, they also run from
treatment and family).
But see Paul Galloway, Church Reinstates Priest Accused of Sex Molestation, CHI.
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united communities, armed with information provided by sex offender
community notification laws, are able to apply social pressure to drive
sex offenders out of their neighborhoods. 209 Running sex offenders
out of wealthier communities, however, sends them into low-income
areas where crime already runs rampant and where the community is
not able to protect itself from an influx of potentially dangerous
persons. 10 Sex offender community notification laws, therefore,
clearly derogate the lifestyles of sex offenders and cast a heavy doubt
on whether community residents are capable of responsibly dealing
with information received regarding convicted sex offenders.2" After
considering the dangers and realities presented by vigilante justice, the
TRIB., Oct. 13, 1995, § 1, at I (detailing the reinstatement of a Chicago pastor on
October 12, 1995, after his removal for sexual misconduct). Rev. John Calicott, a
Roman Catholic priest, engaged in sex acts involving two teenage boys in 1976. Id.
Nonetheless, the Archdiocese of Chicago, his victims, and his parishioners wanted
Calicott back. Id. at I, 20. See also Andrew Herrmann, Priest Returns Despite Abuse,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at 18 (quoting parishioner Jim Brown, father of two
minor children, as saying "'I feel whatever he did is in the past. He paid his dues."').
Additionally, church member Jessica Hamilton explained that warm feelings
accompanied Calicott's return when she said that "'[wie feel so good that Father John is
coming back .... He has been a role model to a lot of children."' Galloway, supra, at
20. See also Past Abuse Casts Cloud on Disney: Director of 'Powder' is Convicted
Molester, CHI. TRIB., § I, at 10 (noting Wait Disney Corporation's support for
filmmaker Victor Salva after learning that he served 15 months of a three year sentence
in a state prison for sexually abusing a 12-year-old actor in 1987). Salva continued to
direct "Powder," a new Disney film about a teenage boy with telekinetic powers, despite
the victim's protests. Id. Roger Birnbaum, of Caravan Pictures, explained that Salva
"paid for his crime, he paid his debt to society .... What happened eight years ago has
nothing to do with this movie." Id.
209. Shankar Vedantam, Sex Offender Notification Law Questioned by Experts:
Offenders' Civil Rights One Issue, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 17, 1995,
at A8. Some commentators have noted that "'[n]eighborhoods that are united can move
these people into communities that can't defend themselves . . . . It's usually the
wealthier communities who can move the person on."' Id. (quoting Vernon Quinsey,
Professor of Psychology at Queens University, Kingston, Ontario). Consequently, sex
offender notification laws "serve a NIMBY-Not In My Back Yard-purpose by
encouraging sex offenders to move elsewhere." Woo, supra note 69, at 17A.
210. Montana, supra note 63, at 582. "In particular, sex offenders find large cities
and inner city areas attractive because law enforcement agencies in these areas usually
lack the time and resources to enforce community notification laws. As a result, large
cities and inner city areas have become safe havens for migrating sex offenders." Id. at
582-83. Furthermore, sex offender community notification laws "appear[] to promote
sex offender dumping-the notion that if given enough time, a community can attempt
to keep the offender from coming to their neighborhood, thereby forcing the released
offender to go to some other community, namely, places with less stringent notification
laws." Silva, supra note 14, at 1972.
2 11. See supra note 206 (discussing a sex offender's misfortune when his neighbors
burned down his house after learning of his criminal history).
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court will likely conclude that the stigma imposed by community
notification outweighs the gravity of the sex offense.
After comparing the gravity of the offense to the severity of the
penalty, the court must then determine whether the notification policies
contained in the Community Notification Act are proportional to
penalties imposed on other offenders in Illinois.21 2 Courts have ana-
lyzed this issue in either of two ways.2t 3 First, a court can view sex
crimes as a category of their own, distinct from other offenses. 2,
4
Under this approach, the court will likely maintain that the same degree
of notification is warranted for all sex offenders. 2 5 Therefore, the
punishment imposed would be proportional to that exacted upon all
child sex offenders.1 6
A court can also, however, opt to compare sex offenses with other
offenses generally.1 7 Because no other offender in Illinois is sub-
jected to community notification, the court will likely determine that
sex offenders are treated much more harshly than other equally danger-
ous offenders."' As such, the Community Notification Act would be
212. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
213. Houston, supra note 14, at 754. ("When comparing the sentences imposed for
other crimes in the same jurisdiction to the sentences imposed by Sex Offender
Registration Acts, courts have viewed sex offenses either as within a category by
themselves or in comparison to other kinds of offenses.").
214. Id.
215. Id. Such a position was taken in State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134, 139 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1990), where the Arizona Court of Appeals perceived sex crimes as unique from all
other crimes. The court reasoned that since all sex offenders are required to register, the
punishment imposed on sex offenders is proportional to that imposed for similarly
situated offenders. Id. at 139-40. Even though the Solem test does not require strict
proportionality between the crime and the sentence, the Illinois law may be found
grossly disproportionate where it mandates disclosure of the registrant's information
irrespective of the severity and dangerousness of the offense committed by the sex
offender.
216. Houston, supra note 14, at 754.
217. Id.
218. Id. Nonetheless, in comparing the registration requirements for sex offenders in
Illinois to the severe mandatory life sentence imposed by the Illinois habitual criminal
statute, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33-B (West 1995), the Illinois Appellate
Court in Adams determined that the registration requirement was not disproportionate to
punishments for other crimes. People v. Adams, 555 N.E.2d 761, 767 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990), aff'd, 581 N.E.2d 637 (III. 1991). In doing so, the court distinguished the
asperity of life imprisonment from the minimal impediments involved in registration.
Id.
A court may hesitate in concluding that the penalties for child sex offenders are
proportional to the ones inflicted upon offenders whose victims are over 18, assuming
both are convicted of the same crime. It could be argued, however, that such an approach
in differentiating between adult sex offenders and child sex offenders merely exemplifies
the catalyst of sex offender registration and notification laws-protecting children.
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grossly disproportional to penalties imposed on other offenders in
Illinois.
Finally, the court must determine whether the sentence imposed
under the Community Notification Act is proportional to the laws
implemented in other jurisdictions.219 Because the Community Notifi-
cation Act represents a unique approach to community notification as
compared to other states, it is unlikely that a court will conclude that
Illinois' law is proportional to similar laws enacted in other states.220
Only one other jurisdiction provides for mandatory disclosure of sex
offenders. 221 Additionally, the more common approach to sex of-
fender community notification provides for varying degrees of notifi-
cation based on the dangerousness of the sex offender in order to
carefully calibrate the need for public disclosure.222 Even though the
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that there will always
be one state which punishes their offenders more intensely than the
223other states, an Illinois court would likely find that the Community
Notification Act inflicts a punishment that is grossly disproportionate
to any other law of its kind.
In sum, assuming a court finds that the stigma accompanying
community notification constitutes punishment, the court will proceed
to the second prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. Because the
court will likely find that the Community Notification Act is not
commensurate with other penalties inflicted on equally dangerous
criminals in Illinois, or on child sex offenders in other states, a court
will probably find the Community Notification Act to be grossly
219. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
221. "Megan's Law" is the only other sex offender community notification law that
mandates public disclosure. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1995). See
supra notes 63, 69-79, and accompanying text.
222. For example, both New Jersey's and New York's sex offender community
notification provisions provide for three tiers of classification based on the sex
offender's risk of reoffense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 168-
L(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996). See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text for a
description of New Jersey's sex offender community notification law.
Because the Community Notification Act does not provide for three tiers of
notification carefully calibrated to the need for public disclosure, the Illinois law is not
likely to pass constitutional muster. In failing to differentiate between the offenders'
risks of reoffense, the law is likely to impose greater notification requirements on sex
offenders than other offenders in Illinois, as well as sex offenders in other states. See
supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
223. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980) ("Absent a constitutionally
imposed uniformity inimical-to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always
bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other
State.").
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disproportional to the crime charged. As such, the court should con-
clude that the Community Notification Act violates the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment.
2. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy involves the sex offender's reasonable
expectation of avoiding the government's unjustified disclosure of
private information. 22 To support his privacy claim, the sex offender
first must establish that he has a reasonable expectation in keeping his
past sex offenses confidential. 5 Second, the sex offender must then
establish that his interest in privacy outweighs the state's interest in
infringing upon his right to privacy.226 Although the sex offender has
a strong desire to protect his reputation in the community, the sex
offender's argument for right to privacy fails at each stage of the
constitutional analysis.227
First, sex offenders will have difficulty establishing a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their past sex offenses because all adult
criminal records are open to public review.228 The public nature of
these records means that adult sex offenders have a reduced expec-
tation of privacy.229 Consequently, if a court follows Poritz, it will
find that the sex offender's expectation of privacy, while reduced, is
still reasonable enough to warrant further analysis of his privacy
rights.2 30 The Illinois courts should, however, declare that the sex
offender's reduced expectation to privacy does not even trigger a right
to privacy claim, and thus, will terminate its constitutional analysis.2
224. See supra part II.B.2.
225. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held
that the publication of an arrest record does not violate an individual's right to privacy.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 713 (1975). In Paul, the Supreme Court determined
that reputation alone does not command special constitutional protections, and that the
right to privacy does not prohibit a state from publicizing an arrest record. Id. As such,
the plaintiff in Paul, named by local police as an "active shoplifter" in flyers distributed
to local merchants, had suffered no deprivation of liberty resulting from injury to his
reputation. Id. at 697, 713. More likely than not, however, a shoplifter will not have
as great an interest in keeping his arrest record private as compared to a sex offender
whose behavior is considered to be abusive and deviant by society. One commentator
has noted that "[tihe public's rage against sex offenders is more than understandable.
Their crimes, especially when visited upon children, leave life-long scars and offend the
community's deepest sensibilities." Martone, supra note 73, at 39.
230. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
23 1. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
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Assuming that a court continues to the second prong of the right to
privacy analysis, it is likely that the court nevertheless will follow
Poritz and determine that the sex offender's interest in maintaining
anonymity is outweighed by the state's interest in protecting its citizens
from sex offenders.
The sex offender's right to privacy claim fails for an additional
reason. Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has used the
right to privacy to protect activities that society considers intimate.233
These activities break down into three areas of fundamental rights:
reproduction, family relations, and abortion.234 In essence, the sex
offender's argument for his right to privacy centers around his desire
to protect his reputation.2 3 5 Notably, an interest in reputation is not
considered to be an area of intimacy.236 Because this privacy interest
falls outside the scope of traditional right to privacy claims, a court will
likely determine that the Community Notification Act does not violate
the sex offender's right to privacy.
B. Pragmatic Effects of Community Notification
Sex offender community notification laws are intended to further
protect the community from sex offenders.237 Nonetheless, the actual
success of community notification in serving that purpose is ques-
tionable.238 The success of sex offender community notification laws
232. See supra notes 12i-22 and accompanying text.
233. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (explaining that "only personal
rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy") (citations omitted).
234. Id. (stating that "the right [of privacy] has some extension to activities relating
to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453-54; id. at 460, 463-65 (White, J., concurring in result); family relationships,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)").
235. See supra note 229.
236. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 713 (1975) (holding that reputation
alone does not command special constitutional protections, and that the right to privacy
does not prohibit a state from publicizing an arrest record).
237. Representative Klingler, sponsor of House Bill 2517, "believes that parents
and community residents deserve access to the information already collected by police
[pursuant to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act] so they can protect their children
[from sex offenders]." Cindy Richards, Kids May Get Protection They Need, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at 31.
238. Jenny Cuffe, Protection: The Menace in Their Midst, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Oct. 4, 1995, § 2, at 2 (noting that "[r]esearch suggests that notification makes little or
no difference to the chances of a high risk offender committing another crime"). See
also Martone, supra note 73, at 38 (stating that "[i]t is debatable whether these
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depend, in large part, on the cooperation of the sex offenders.239 In
order for a community to be notified of a sex offender's presence, the
sex offender, himself, must first register with the proper officials in
that community.24 Pursuant to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration
Act, sex offenders not only must register within thirty days of their
release from prison, but also every year thereafter. 24' If sex offenders
fail to register, however, the goal of community notification is de-
feated. 42 Already, 40% of the sex offenders in Washington243 and
almost 75% of the sex offenders in California2' have failed to register.
Clearly, the penalty imposed for failure to register has not deterred sex
offenders from violating community notification laws; in fact, the
consequences of registering-facing ostracism in the community-can
outweigh this penalty and might actually deter sex offenders from
complying with notification laws.245
[notification] laws ... actually deter crime").
239. See Montana, supra note 63, at 590. "The 'entire notification process depends
on the ex-offenders cooperation . . . . [When] he moves to another town [and] fails to
give his whereabouts . . . [he] once again becomes anonymous."' Id. at 590 n.96
(quoting Ed Martone, Issue of Sex Offender Registration and Notification 2 (1994)
(unpublished article on file with the Journal of Law and Policy)).
240. Id. at 590 ("Before the process of community notification begins, a convicted
sex offender must register the address at which the offender plans to reside.").
241. See supra notes 140, 146, 148, and accompanying text.
242. Montana, supra note 63, at 592 ("Convicted sex offenders, however, can easily
defeat "Megan's Law" by failing to register with the proper authorities.").
Additionally, sex offenders can defeat the purpose of community notification laws by
committing further sexual offenses outside of the community in which they reside. Id.
See also Parsons & Kass, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining that critics of the proposed
community notification laws argue that even though "[s]ex offenders might be registered
with the local police precinct or sheriff's department, . . . they could still drive outside
the jurisdiction where they weren't known"). The Community Notification Act permits
law enforcement agencies to notify only persons "likely to encounter" the offender
within the community in which the sex offender lives. See supra note 179.
243. Cuffe, supra note 238, at 2. See also Montana, supra note 63, at 580 n.48
(indicating that almost 50% of the sex offenders in Washington relocated to states with
less intrusive notification laws).
244. Montana, supra note 63, at 592. In 1994, California could not account for
49,000 sex offenders. Bill Stall & Cathleen Decker, California Elections/Governor;
Candidates' Crime Proposals Called Unrealistic; Critics Say Brown and Wilson Are
Ignoring Issues of Cost and Effectiveness in the Debate over Whose Stance is Tougher.
Meanwhile, at Simultaneous News Conferences, the Battle Escalates, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1994, at A29.
245. Montana, supra note 63, at 593 (arguing that "the negative consequences that
ensue from the registration process greatly outweigh any deterrent effect that this
penalty might have"). For example, after registering with the proper authorities in
Washington after his release from prison, local law enforcement personnel passed out
fliers detailing a sex offender registrant's photo and criminal history. Jim Hooker,
Megan's Law Has a Harsh Prototype; How Statute Works in Another State, RECORD
(Trenton, N.J.), Oct. 10, 1994, at A6. Soon thereafter, the registrant's landlord evicted
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Moreover, there is little evidence that community notification laws
actually protect children or adults from sex offenders.2 6 To the con-
trary, one study found that Washington's community notification law
has not significantly reduced repeat sex offenses.247 According to the
study, sex offenders subject to community notification committed new
crimes an average of 25.1 months after their release from prison.248
Rather than furthering a state's goal of preventing future sex offenses,
community notification serves only as a reactive measure reflecting the
community's outrage over the proliferation of sex crimes against
children.249
Predictions of dangerousness are also imperative to the success of
sex offender community notification laws, especially with respect to
notification laws that provide for varying levels of notification
dependent upon the degree of risk that a sex offender poses to
society. Often these risk assessments are performed by state and
him. Id. The registrant stated that he would register once more, but after that "it's 'the
hell with their [notification] program."' Id.
246. Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at I. "[T]here is little evidence so far that these
laws protect children ..... Id.
247. Donna D. Schram & Cheryl D. Milloy, Community Notification: A Study of
Offender Characteristics and Recidivism, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, Oct. 1995, at
16. One reporter noted that "the Washington State Institute for Public Policy concludes
the [Washington sex offender community notification] law has failed to significantly
reduce repeat offenses by sex predators." Eric Houston, Law is Helping Track Sex
Offenders, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 1995, at B2. Actually, the total number
of sex offenses in Washington increased from 2,277 in 1991 to 2,597 in 1992.
Jerusalem, supra note 96, at 246 n.174. The Washington State Institute study tracked
adult and juvenile sex offenders who were subject to community-wide notification and
compared their offense behavior with a group of sex offenders who were not subject to
such notification. Schram & Milloy, supra, at 2-3. In essence, the study found that both
groups of offenders reoffended at a similar rate. Id. at 16. The study determined,
however, that those sex offenders subject to notification reoffended more quickly than
the comparison group. Id.
248. Schram & Milloy, supra note 247, at 15. Ironically, those sex offenders who
were not subject to Washington's community notification provision committed new
crimes 61.7 months after their release from prison. Id. See also Paul Leavitt, Sex-Law
Study, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 1995, at 3A (detailing the results of the Washington study).
249. Jerusalem, supra note 96, at 223 (stating that "[w]hile public notification may
seem like a good solution at first glance, a deeper analysis reveals it is a reactive
measure that does not work, and which may bring even more harm than prevention to
communities").
250. Blacher, supra note 46, at 913 (explaining that the "predictions of danger-
ousness ... are central to law enforcement and the judicial system's mandate to control
crime"). The local law enforcement agencies in Illinois will also have to rely on some
form of risk assessments in determining whether or not to further disseminate a
registrant's personal information to persons likely to encounter a sex offender. See
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
Although the amended Illinois' Child Sex Offender Registration Act provides that the
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county prosecutors.25' While the Constitution does not prohibit the
use of risk assessments,252 they are inherently inaccurate.2 This
inaccuracy stems not only from allowing untrained professionals to
speculate as to what a person may do in the future,254 but also because
the tools used to make such predictions are accurate only one-third of
the time. 255  In essence, two-thirds of the sex offenders will be
improperly assessed. 6 The combination of these two impediments
sex offender must register with the local law enforcement agency within 10 days when he
moves from one community to another, the law fails to indicate who will decide the
proper level of notification to be administered in the new community. See supra note
141 and accompanying text.
25 1. For example, "Megan's Law" requires the State's Attorneys in the counties
where the sex offender was convicted and subsequently plans to reside to determine the
sex offender's risk of reoffense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(d)(1) (West 1995).
252. Bochnewich, supra note 37, at 301. Bochnewich notes the following:
[The United States Supreme Court cases] almost uniformly adopt a choice of
public safety from recidivists over the individual liberty interests of the . . .
[registrant]. The critical literature almost universally advocates a greater
solicitude for the individual liberty interest infringed upon. Since it is
apparent that the Constitution has not been interpreted to prevent the use of
prediction, then the rationales for choosing one interest over the other, based
upon admittedly imperfect prediction tools, rest upon other than a purely legal
justification.
Id.
253. Blacher, supra note 46, at 913. See also Bochnewich, supra note 37, at 283
(detailing the lack of accuracy involved in predictions of dangerousness). Moreover,
"[o]pponents [of sex offender community notification laws] . . . claim that the
prediction accuracy of individual recidivism is so low that it seriously threatens
individual freedom and autonomy without adequate justification." Id.; see also Montana,
supra note 63, at 589-90 (noting the inherent inaccuracy in risk assessments). Because
the risk assessments are arbitrary, there is no way to ensure that the children of Illinois
will be protected. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
254. Montana, supra note 63, at 589-90 ("Critics contend that trained professionals
cannot accurately predict an offender's propensity to reoffend and thus warn against
using [untrained] professionals to determine which sex offenders' identities to reveal.").
255. Montana, supra note 63, at 590. Although psychological profiles of sex
offenders are available, the reliability of such profiles is debatable. Profiling Child
Molesters, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE UPDATE, Oct. 1988.
"Studies indicate that predictions of an offender's dangerousness or propensity to
reoffend average a one-third accuracy rate." Id. See also Bochnewich, supra note 37, at
286, 294 (suggesting that "[i]t has been widely accepted for some time that predictions
of an individual's likelihood of committing future serious violent crime are only one-
third accurate"). See also James M. Peters & William D. Murphy, Profiling Child Sexual
Abusers-Legal Considerations, CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV., Mar. 1992, at 43 (confirming
that evidence characterizing the psychological profile of a child molester is not
reliable).
256. Montana, supra note 63, at 590 ("In other words, predictions of dangerousness
are inaccurate an average of two out of every three cases."). See also Bochnewich, supra
note 37, at 294 (analyzing the two-thirds "false positive" predictions inherent in
predictions of dangerousness).
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ensures that potentially dangerous sex offenders will escape
community-wide notification, while some low-risk offenders will be
subjected to it.257
Aside from the legal problems inherent in community notification,
public disclosure also creates adverse reactions in the community such
as vigilantism, 258 community migration, 259 and intense fear that may
undermine offenders' efforts at reintegration.260 Such community
reaction could also affect a state's efforts to deter sex offenders from
reoffending. 26' The stress derived from community harassment may
actually compel sex offenders to reoffend.262 Opponents of com-
munity notification argue that notification laws do little to prevent the
occurrence of sex crimes and, instead, cause released sex offenders to
relapse due to the difficulties in finding a job and/or reintegrating into
the community.263 Moreover, in causing sex offenders to relocate
from one town to another, community harassment prevents sex of-
fenders from remaining in a stable, supportive, and possibly effective,
treatment environment.2
Equally important, notification laws create a false sense of
security.265 In essence, community notification laws create the illusion
257. Montana, supra note 63, at 590. These factors "create an arbitrary system in
which some convicted sex offenders will fall into the category of high risk offenders
while others will not. Thus, potentially dangerous sex offenders may escape community
notification... and live anonymously in... communities." Id.
258. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
262. Montana, supra note 63, at 585.
263. See, e.g., id., at 585 n.78 (detailing the accounts of a sex offender who went on
a rampage after seeing his photo and criminal history depicted on a television news
show).
264. See Jerusalem, supra note 96, at 232. Some experts claim:
[Ilf a sex offender is in an environment in which certain factors are present, he
might be able to curb his recidivistic behavior. For example, if he can
maintain a low stress level, achieve employment stability, overcome denial,
empathize with the victim, contain his anger, refrain from chemical abuse, and
be a part of a social system, he may be at a low risk for recidivistic behavior.
Id. at 232 n.83.
See also Decter, supra note 46, at 61 (explaining that "[c]ommunity notification laws
do little or nothing to prevent a sex offender from striking again; they simply make it
more likely that the offender will be hounded from one town to another'-possibly
becoming even more dangerous than he might otherwise be, away from the control of
family and friends") (quoting Dealing with Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at
14A); Martone, supra note 73, at 39 (arguing that "notification laws cause compulsive
sex offenders to run from family, avoid treatment and seek the safety of anonymity by
hiding out, thus subjecting the public to even greater risk").
265. Kiernan & Bils, supra note 4, at 1. See also Martone, supra note 73, at 39
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that society has, within each community, completely dealt with the
dangers presented by sex offenders.266 In actuality, however, not all
sex offenders fall within the fullest reach of notification laws.2 67 For
instance, the Community Notification Act mandates disclosure only to
school officials, the Department of Children and Family Services, and
child care facilities. 268  Disclosure to those persons most likely to
encounter the sex offender is only discretionary.269 Moreover, there is
no guarantee that the sex offenders who remain anonymous to their
neighbors will not reoffend. 270 Accordingly, even when a state enacts
a notification law, individual community members remain the primary
protectors of children and others who may fall victim to a sex of-
fender.27' As a result, sex offender community notification laws cause
anxiety and fear in a community while offering limited benefits to its
residents.272
(explaining that the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union argued that "[Megan's] law would
merely create an illusion of safety"). Because parents might "view these laws as [an]
,automatic protection for children,"' sex offender community notification laws may
create a false sense of security. Silva, supra note 14, at 1979 n.156 (quoting Steve
Wheeler, Sex Laws Protection Not Automatic, SUNDAY ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov.
6, 1994, at BI).
266. See Idaho Law Doesn't Mandate Public Disclosure of Registry, LEWISTON
MORNING TRIB. (Lewiston, Idaho), Dec. 5, 1993, at 5A (stating that "[ilt creates a sense
that the problem has been taken care of").
267. Id. "If a sex offender isn't on the registry, it doesn't mean he isn't a sex
offender. 'It just means he's not been caught or not been convicted."' Id. (quoting Bruce
Bistline of the ACLU in Boise, Idaho).
268. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 179 and accompanying text. The Community Notification Act
directs each local law enforcement agency to create its own procedures for the public
inspection of child sex offender registries. Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 111. Legis. Serv.
4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 152/120(b), (c),
125(b), (c)).
270. See Montana, supra note 63, at 595 (explaining that under "Megan's Law",
"[law enforcement agencies cannot notify community members when moderate or low
risk offenders intend to move into their communities, nor can authorities guarantee that
these offenders will not reoffend.").
271. Enforcing Megan's Law: N.J. Attorney General Issues Needed Guidelines,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Asbury Park, N.J.), Sept. 24, 1995, at C2. "[N]o law can protect
everyone at all times. Parents remain the primary protectors of their children." Id.
It appears then that sex offender community notification laws actually attempt to
support neighborhoods in dealing with a problem that the legislators "have failed to
solve." Megan's Law Puts Burden on the Public, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Sept.
25, 1995, at A6. It is as if "[t]he state says 'We think he's a danger, a threat, a time
bomb waiting to go off and we thought you'd like to know.' But if the state couldn't deal
with him, what can I do?" Vedantam, supra note 209, at A8 (quoting Edward Martone of
New Jersey).
272. Montana, supra note 63, at 576 n.28. Jerry Sheehan of the ACLU stated that
"he did not 'see one whit of evidence of any additional community security created by
this notification process. It only causes anxiety and fear, without any additional
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V. PROPOSAL
Sex offender community notification laws are an example of a
quick-fix, band-aid reaction to the serious threats imposed by sex
offenders.273 Illinois' Community Notification Act will go into effect
only after a sex offense has occurred, and only if the sex offender is
apprehended and convicted.2 4 Furthermore, this so-called "protec-
tion" from sex offenders might last for only ten years.
Illinois, however, was left with no choice-it had to enact a sex
offender notification law. Even though the Community Notification
Act is a reactive measure that will not further the state's goal of pro-
tecting its children from initial acts of sexual aggression, it is the
approach being adopted by a growing number of states.276 With the
national trend of implementing community notification laws, prudence
dictated that Illinois adopt a notification provision. If Illinois had
failed to enact a sex offender notification law, it risked becoming a safe
haven for sex offenders. 7  Thus, in order to prevent sex offenders
from other states with notification laws from moving to Illinois with
the intent of remaining anonymous,278 Illinois had no choice but to
enact a sex offender community notification law.279
benefits to the community."' Id. (quoting Linda Keene, Legal Dilemmna: Rapists' Rights
vs. Public's Right to Know, SEA^IrLE TIMES, July 13, 1993, at A 14).
273. Commentators have suggested that sex offender community notification laws
are insufficient. Tuite, supra note.5, at 11. "None of these are solutions because they are
merely bandages on cancer." Id. See also Jerusalem, supra note 96, at 245-46
(conceding that, although sex offender community notification laws are an
understandable product of the increase in sex offenses, community notification laws
"are, however, 'reactive' policies: A community learns of an attack on a citizen and its
first reaction is to think that the attack could have been prevented if residents had only
known that someone with a history of sex offenses lived among them").
274. Actual community notification does not begin unless a sex offender is arrested
and convicted of attempting or completing one of the 14 sex offenses defined in the Sex
Offender Registration Act. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other problems
relating to the registering of sex offenders, see supra notes 237-43 and accompanying
text.
276. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
279. The Illinois State General Assembly, however, should have adopted a sex
offender community notification law which provides for three tiers of notification based
on the sex offender's risk of reoffense in order to carefully calibrate the need for public
disclosure. See supra notes 74-77 for a discussion of another statute that establishes
tiers of notification. Also, the notification law should have afforded the sex offender an
opportunity to challenge the breadth of notification to which he will be subjected. See
supra note 78. Additionally, the General Assembly should have limited the application
to adult sex offenders. See supra notes 150, 175-78, and accompanying text. However,
the General Assembly need not have restricted community notification to only adult sex
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Nevertheless, rather than simply reacting to acts of sexual violence,
Illinois should also enact a prophylactic measure which aims to dimin-
ish the commission of sex crimes against children. 280  A proactive
approach should emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of preventing
and treating sexual abuse.28' Moreover, a proactive approach recog-
nizes that societal and parental responsibility for the safety of children
and others is desperately needed to properly attack the grave and per-
vasive problems resulting from sexual abuse.282 Prevention, via edu-
cation, emerges as the key to furthering the state's goal of protecting
children, and others in society, from sexual abuse.283 Notably,
offenders whose victims were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. See supra
note 176 and accompanying text. Rather, Illinois' sex offender community notification
provision should have included all adult sex offenders. See supra note 176 and
accompanying text. Also, the General Assembly should not have permitted such a law
to be applied retroactively. See supra notes 61, 69, and accompanying text; see also
Pub. Act No. 89-428, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 4039 (West) (to be codified at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 152/101-130)).
280. FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 224 (stating that "[s]exual abuse prevention is a
new field"). Finkelhor explains that "[tihe rationale for prevention rests on a number of
realities about child sexual abuse. First, . . . an important percentage of all children will
suffer such abuse." Id. at 225. Finkelhor adds that additionally and "[m]ore important,.
• . most children do not reveal their victimization, and, when they do, families are still
unlikely to seek help." Id.
28 1. CONFERENCE, supra note 1, at 61 (quoting remarks made by Gabriella V. Cohen,
Executive Director, Human Effective Learning Program, Chicago). The problem of
sexual abuse is too complex to be dealt with by one professional dimension alone. Id. at
43 (quoting remarks made by Jon R. Conte, Professor, School of Social Service
Administration, University of Chicago). See also id. at 45 (stressing the need for an
exhaustive investigation into the area of child sexual abuse, involving the cooperative
and concerted efforts of law enforcement personnel, social workers, and criminologists
(citing to remarks made by Wayne A. Meyer, Chief, Felony Review Section, Cook
County State's Attorney's Office)). Richard J. Elrod, the Sheriff of Cook County,
indicated that:
[s]exual abuse is by its very nature both a legal and a mental health problem.
It is a legal problem because it is a crime in every state in the union, and,
therefore, it is the function of the law to protect the victim and to ensure that
re-abuse does not occur.... It is also a mental health problem because of its
impact on both the offenders and their victims.
Id. at 51-52.
See also FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at II (emphasizing the notion that "[slexual abuse
does not fall clearly within the domain of one particular discipline"). Rather, the
problems inherent in sex abuse are addressed by professionals in psychology, social
work, sociology, criminology, nursing, law, psychiatry, counseling psychology, and
pediatrics. Id.
282. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
283. FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 225. Finkelhor states:
[P]revention has great appeal as an approach to sexual abuse. It holds the
potential of reaching a large number of children, short-circuiting some abuse
before it occurs, and increasing the number of victims who get help. And it
holds the potential of accomplishing these goals in a cost-efficient way,
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prevention techniques should not be directed only toward children.284
Rather, preventative efforts must also target parents and profes-
sionals.285
When addressing children, the goal of prevention is to arm the child
with the knowledge and confidence to respond safely when confronted
with a possible sex offender.286 Prevention directed toward children
encompasses the following tasks: defining the term sexual abuse in
language children can understand; teaching children how to distinguish
between appropriate and sexual touches; making children more aware
of possible potential sexual offenders; teaching children of their right
to say "no"; and encouraging children to report any incident of, or
attempt at, sexual abuse. 287 School-based educational programs for
children emphasizing prevention have proven successful in other
states, and Illinois would be wise to adopt and implement such pro-
grams.288
When prevention includes parents and other adults, the educational
issues should consist of the basic understanding of what sexual abuse
is; symptoms of child abuse; resources available to a sexually abused
child and his or her family; and tactical ways to discuss sexual abuse
with children.2 9 Finally, prevention techniques must be directed at
without the institution of major new social programs.
Id.
284. Id. at 226.
285. Id. ("Although the objective . . . is to help children, not all prevention
approaches have children as their exclusive or primary audiences.").
286. Id. at 254. In attempts to prevent child sexual abuse, it is imperative to take a
child's perspective. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 37, at 173. For instance, before
addressing children, one must acknowledge that a child's resistance to sexual abuse is
rarely effective due to the offender's determination. Id. Furthermore, it is important to
understand that a child's report of a sexual encounter may go unnoticed not for a lack of
care, but because the child may speak in a cryptic manner. Id. at 174. The statements
"my tummy hurts," "I don't want to go to the toilet," or "I don't like the doctor" may
essentially be a child's attempt to expose sexual abuse. Id.
287. CONFERENCE, supra note I, at 59 (citing to remarks made by Gabriella V. Cohen,
Executive Director, Human Effective Learning Program, Chicago); FINKELHOR, supra
note 34, at 226-27.
288. Montana, supra note 63, at 602 n.155. See, e.g., FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at
247-54 (detailing the various sexual abuse prevention programs implemented in grade
schools, the programs' success rates, and future tests and approaches that may help
improve the effectiveness of these programs). Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637 (I11. 1991), suggested that educating the children of
Illinois is "the most logical alternative available to the legislature . I..." ld. at 641.
289. FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 229-34. Finkelhor states:
Prevention education directed toward parents has some advantages because of
the central role parents play in children's lives. If parents learn to educate
children themselves, children may receive repeated exposures to information
from a trusted source, a situation that a special classroom presentation cannot
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teachers, physicians, mental health professionals, and law enforcement
personnel." The focus again should be educating these professionals
on what sexual abuse is, the resources available to a victim of sexual
abuse, and most importantly, the warning signs of sexual abuse. 29'
Sexual abuse poses a unique challenge to.everyone in a community.
By carefully crafting, implementing, and involving children, parents
and professionals in a sexual abuse prevention program, Illinois can
begin to further its goals of protecting its citizens from sex offenders.
By enacting a comprehensive prevention plan, the General Assembly
can provide Illinois communities with more protection than the Com-
munity Notification Act can provide alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
A sex offender community notification law would not have saved
ten-year-old Christopher Meyer. In fact, Illinois' Community Notifi-
cation Act will probably not protect most other children, as well as
others in society, from the tremendous threat of sexual offenders.
Nonetheless, Illinois had little choice but to enact this ineffective and
reactive law in order to prevent an influx of sex offenders into the
state.
To actually protect the children of Illinois, the General Assembly
should implement proactive educational programs targeting children,
parents, and professionals. With such preventative programs, Illinois
parallel. Moreover, educating parents also holds out the possibility of
dramatically increasing the detection of children who have become victims
(because parents will become more sensitive to signs of abuse) and of
improving the reactions of parents when they hear about or discover these
victimizations.
Id. at 229.
Additionally, "[tihe importance of educating parents is also underlined by the apparent
inadequacy of what parents currently do to alert their children about sexual abuse." Id.
One study revealed that of 521 parents of children aged 6 to 14, only 29% spoke with
their children about sexual abuse. Id. Of the 29% that did discuss sexual abuse with their
children, only 53% mentioned that an abuser may be an adult friend. Id. Moreover, only
22% told their children that a sexual abuser could be a relative. Id. Notably, "[m]ost
child sexual abuse offenders are not strangers, but persons whom the abused child knows
and trusts." NATIONAL VIcrIM CENTER, supra note 41, at 5.
Furthermore, it has been argued that "[plarents who want to protect their children have
better options that involve less regulation and government intrusion [than sex offender
community notification laws]. Teach children not to talk to strangers. Don't let them
go out alone. Get to know their teachers, scout leaders and coaches." Child Sex Abuser
Bill Is Assault on Privacy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at 31. In essence, "[b]eing
involved in children's lives is much more effective than" community notification. Id.
290. FINKELHOR, supra note 34, at 234-35.
291. Id.
448 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
will arm its children with the tools necessary to respond safely to
attempts at sexual offenses. As such, the General Assembly will in-
crease the likelihood of reducing the number of sex offenses perpe-
trated in Illinois.
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